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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1 -

Because Garco failed to appeal the trial court's initial grant of summary
judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review that order.

The appellate court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of law that may be raised and
considered at any stage of the proceedings. Hausknect v. Industrial Commission, 882 P.2d 683, 694
(Utah App. 1994).
ISSUE 2 -

Garco did not present any new evidence or offer anything other than a rehash
of old arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.

The trial court's decision to deny a motion to reconsider will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 fn. 2 (Utah App. 1993); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1994). (Issue preserved at R.453-62.)
ISSUE 3 -

Garco failed to carry its burden on summary judgment to present sufficient
evidence to warrant a trial on any of the causes of action that it had raised.

The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and affirmed if the undisputed
material facts demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is correct as a matter of law. Fashion
Place Investment, Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah App. 1989). (Issue preserved at
R.436-40).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE. Reagan has an outdoor advertising sign on the property

immediately to the north of Garco's property, and within 500 feet of Garco's southern property line.
Because Utah statutes require 500-foot spacing between outdoor advertising signs, Garco cannot
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contract with any of Reagan's competitors to place a sign on Garco's property. Garco itself had
benefitted from the 500-foot spacing requirement for a number of years -- Reagan had maintained a sign
several feet north of Garco's southern property line that had for years prevented Garco's northern
neighbor from contracting with Reagan or Reagan's competitors to place a sign on its property. But
because Reagan would not agree to Garco's terms for continued maintenance of a sign on Garco's
property, Garco told Reagan to remove its sign.
Reagan did remove its sign from Garco's property and erected its new sign on the northern
neighbor's property. The new sign is within 500 feet of Garco's southern property line, and Garco's
neighbor is now the beneficiary of the 500-foot spacing requirement. Unhappy with the effect that the
500-foot spacing requirement has had on its ability to erect a competing sign, Garco has sued Reagan
for intentional interference with economic relations, unfair practices and punitive damages.
As additional castigation, Garco has added claims for trespass and unlawful detainer arising out
of the underground portion of the sign foundation that Reagan left when it removed its sign from
Garco's property ~ a foundation that is flat (within 1/4 inch of being level to the ground) and which
does not interfere with Garco's parking utilization or access to its building (R.133, ^[25; R.144-45, 146,
160) (see, also, Appendix 1 hereto, photos of the foundation provided to the trial court at R.541, pp.5-6
for illustrative purposes). Reagan had left the foundation in place in response to Garco's concerns that
its removal might compromise the integrity of Garco's adjacent building foundation (R.191, 253).
The trial court correctly dismissed each and every one of Garco's claims on summary judgment.
Unsatisfied with the trial court's ruling, Garco insisted that the trial court reconsider that dismissal.
Garco then urged the trial court to stay its decision on reconsideration until the Federal District Court
for the District of Utah could rule on state and federal antitrust claims which Garco had filed against

2

Reagan after the trial court had dismissed Garco's state court claims through its original summary
judgment ruling.
The trial court appropriately refused to stay its decision or to reconsider its previous dismissal
of Garco's claims. Thereafter, Garco appealed only the denial of its motion to reconsider. It is that
decision of the trial court which is before this Court. (The federal court dismissed Garco's antitrust
claims in August 1998, ruling that Reagan was entitled to state action immunity with regard to Garco's
Sherman Act claims.) (Appendix 2 hereto).
2.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: Garco's September 10, 1996 complaint asserted five

causes of action, including intentional interference with economic relations, unfair practices, trespass,
unlawful detainer, and punitive damages (R.l-5). Reagan stated a counterclaim against Garco for
breach of a covenant against competition (R.63-65).
Almost one year after Garcofiledits complaint, on August 8,1997, Reaganfiledits motion for
summary judgment with regard to all of Garco's causes of action. Garco timely filed some 70 pages
of opposition to the motion (R. 196-267). Reagan submitted the motion pursuant to Rule 4-501,
U.CJ.Admin., on September 12, 1997 (R.305). A hearing was scheduled for November 24, 1997
(R.357).
On November 17, 1997, just seven days prior to the hearing on Reagan's motion for summary
judgment, Garco filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims in the case, including
Reagan's counterclaim (R.398). Garco submitted two new affidavits (R.361-80), and raised a series
of new arguments in support of its theory that Reagan's motion was ill-taken, and that Garco should
be granted summary judgment instead (R.381 -97).
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At the November 24th hearing, the trial court noted that Garco's cross-motion for summary
judgment was not before the court (R.525, p.55), and Reagan objected to the affidavits and arguments
that had been raised in that motion (R.525, p. 14). Nevertheless, in opposition to Reagan's motion,
Garco argued the new issues at length and relied on the new affidavits (R.525, pp.9-14, 32, 35-36, 3839,41-42).
Ruling from the bench, the trial court granted Reagan's motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed Garco's complaint in its entirety (R.525, pp.18, 49-59). The trial court's order was entered
on December 29, 1997 (R.436).
Although the trial court had fully dismissed Garco's complaint, the order was not final because
of Reagan's pending counterclaim. U.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b). Garco then filed a "Motion to Revise Order
and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint." (R.441-52). In its motion, Garco relied on its
previous summary judgment materials, and elaborated on issues that it had previously raised in
opposition to Reagan's motion for summary judgment (R.441-48). In its reply memorandum in support
of its reconsideration motion, Garco raised a series of new arguments (R.446-78). On the same day that
it filed its reply memorandum, Garco filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of
Utah asserting antitrust violations against Reagan (R.480-88). Garco attached a copy of that complaint
to its reply memorandum. Id. As an alternative to an outright reconsideration of the prior grant of
summary judgment in Reagan's favor, Garco asked the trial court to stay its decision on the
reconsideration motion pending the outcome of the federal court case (R.477).1 Reagan filed a motion
to strike the new arguments that Garco had raised for the first time in its reply memo, and objected to

1

The federal court dismissed Garco's Sherman Act claims in full in August 1998, as barred by
the state action doctrine. (Appendix 2 hereto).
4

any stay of the state court proceedings (R.489-90). On May 1, 1998, the trial court entered its Order
granting Reagan's motion to strike. In the same Order, the trial court denied Garco's motion to
reconsider (R.519-20). The trial court also entered a separate order on May 1st dismissing Reagan's
counterclaim pursuant to stipulation of the parties. (R.517-18).
Garco filed its Notice of Appeal on June 1, 1998, stating that it was appealing from "the final
order of the Hon. William B. Bohling entered in this matter on May 1, 1998." Garco's Notice of
Appeal did not indicate which of the two May 1st orders it was appealing. In its docketing statement,
Garco clarified that it was appealing the May 1st Order that had denied the stricken portions of Garco's
reply memorandum and had denied Garco's motion to reconsider. Garco also indicated in its docketing
statement that it was appealing the trial court's December 29, 1997 Order and Judgment dismissing
Garco's Complaint, although Garco's Notice of Appeal had not asserted an appeal from that order.
Reagan filed a "Motion for Partial Summary Disposition or Alternatively to Strike Portions of
Docketing Statement" on the basis that Garco had not appealed the December 29, 1997 Order and that
only the May 1, 1998 Order was at issue on appeal. On September 1, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court
entered its Order deferring a ruling on Reagan's motion. That motion is still pending. The case was
assigned to the Court of Appeals on October 5, 1998.
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS. Reagan entered into a lease agreement in 1975 with Garco's
predecessor-in-interest to the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit (R.l)(Appendix 4).
Pursuant to the terms of the lease, Reagan erected an outdoor advertising sign on the property (Garco's
Brief, p. 4). Garco purchased the property in 1990 with the sign in place (R.367) (hereinafter "Garco
property").

5

During the early 1990s, Garco and Reagan attempted to negotiate the terms of a new lease (R. 1 2). Those negotiations failed, never resulting in a new written lease agreement. On February 23, 1995,
Garco advised Reagan that it had "elected to pursue other options," and demanded that Reagan remove
its sign by July 1995 (R.133,Tf21; R.198, f21). As of February 1995, Garco had called several other
sign companies, intending to have another outdoor advertising sign put up by someone other than
Reagan - but Garco did not follow-up with any of these sign companies until after Reagan removed
its sign from Garco's property in June 1995 (R.133 TTJ22-23; R.199 ffij22-23).
In the meantime, in April 1995, some eight weeks after Garco's advice to Reagan that it was
pursuing other options, Reagan entered into a lease agreement with Garco's neighbor to the north,
Mollerup Moving and Storage (hereinafter "Mollerup") (R.191). Neither Reagan nor any of its
competitors had had a sign on the Mollerup property because the Garco sign was within 500 feet of
Mollerup's northern boundary line (R.267). With Reagan vacating the Garco property, the spacing
requirements of Utah's Outdoor Advertising Act would no longer prevent Mollerup from having an
outdoor advertising sign on its property. Reagan then applied to UDOT for the permits necessary to
move to the Mollerup property (R.191, ^[5; Garco's Brief, p. 10, ^[18).
Reagan removed the sign face and poles from Garco's property in June 1995. In response to
Garco's concerns that removal of the foundation might damage its adjacent building (R.253), Reagan
left the foundation in place (R.191). The foundation was flat (within 1/4 inch of being level to the
ground), could be utilized for parking, and did not impair access to Garco's adjacent building (R.133,
^f25; R. 144-45, 146, 168) (See, also, Appendix 1). More than a year after the sign was removed, with
only the underground foundation remaining, Garco served Reagan with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer
(R.257). Garco's First and Second Causes of Action of its Complaint were for trespass (R.2-3) and for
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unlawful detainer (R.3) arising out of the continued presence of the underground foundation on Garco's
property.2
By the first of June 1995, Reagan had erected a new outdoor advertising sign on Mollerup's
property (Garco's Brief, p. 10, TJ19). The Mollerup sign was within 500 feet of Garco's southern
boundary line (Garco's Brief, p. 5). As the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act requires 500 feet between
outdoor advertising signs, Garco could not contract with Reagan's competitors for a sign on Garco's
property (R. 2-3). Garco asserted that Reagan had deliberately placed the new sign on the Mollerup
property in such a manner as to prevent Garco from contracting with Reagan's competitors, and claimed
that Reagan had intentionally interfered with Garco's prospective economic relations (R.3-4). Reagan
denied Garco's assertions, submitting the affidavit of the neighboring property owner to evidence that
it was the neighbor who had directed the placement of the sign (R. 189-89). Nevertheless, for purposes
of Reagan's summary judgment motion, both Reagan and the trial court assumed Garco's allegations
to be true (R.130; R.438). On the basis of Garco's allegations, the trial court dismissed the tort claim,
ruling that:
Even if the Court implies as true that [Reagan's] purpose in locating the sign as it did
on the neighboring property was to prevent [Garco] from erecting its own sign, there is no
evidence that any injury to [Garco] occasioned by [Reagan's] move of the sign to the
neighboring property was an end in and of itself, designed to harm [Garco] merely for the sake
of injury alone. Instead, [Reagan's] move of the sign to its present location constituted
legitimate competitive activity, consistent with an effort by [Reagan] to achieve the long-range
economic goal of maximizing its profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by

2

The trial court dismissed the trespass claim because it was undisputed that there was a lease
between Reagan and Garco's predecessor-in-interest, and that the lease did not require Reagan to
remove the sign foundation or to restore the property to its former condition upon vacating the
property (R.437). The trial court dismissed the unlawful detainer claim because possession was
returned to Garco when the sign faces and sign structure were removed in June of 1995 and Garco's
Notice of Unlawful Detainer was not served until more than a year later. Id.
7

forestalling competitive activity on the [Garco's] property. Thus, there is no evidence of
improper purpose.
(R.438).
The trial court also ruled that there was no evidence of improper means and that Garco had
failed to take any substantial steps to obtain its own permit until after Reagan applied to UDOT to move
the sign (R.438). Thus, the trial court dismissed Garco's claim for intentional interference with
economic relations (R.438).
Garco's Fourth Cause of Action was an asserted violation of Utah's Unfair Practices Act (R.4),
which the trial court dismissed because Garco failed to offer any evidence that Reagan had engaged in
price discrimination or sold anything at less than cost, as the statute requires. (R.439).3 In dismissing
all of Garco's substantive causes of action, the trial court also dismissed Garco's Fifth Cause of Action
for punitive damages (R.439).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1 -

BECAUSE GARCO FAILED TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S INITIAL
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW THAT ORDER.

In its Notice of Appeal, Garco stated that it was appealing the trial court's May 1, 1998 order.
The May 1st Order had stricken portions of Garco's reply memorandum filed in support of its motion
to reconsider, and had denied Garco's motion to reconsider the December 29,1997 Order and Judgment
dismissing Garco's complaint in full. When there is no reference in the notice of appeal to the order
or judgment with which the appellant takes issue, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the

3

Although Garco claims that it appealed the entirety of Judge Bohling's dismissal of its
complaint (Garco's Brief, p. 1), Garco's Brief does not address Judge Bohling's dismissal of Garco's
Fourth Cause of Action for alleged unfair practices.
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order or judgment on appeal. M.L. andS.L. v. V.H., 894P.2d 1285, 1286, fn.l (Ut.App. 1995). Thus,
the December 29th Order and Judgment dismissing Garco's complaint is not an issue on this appeal.
ISSUE 2 -

GARCO DID NOT PRESENT ANY NEW EVIDENCE OR OFFER ANYTHING
OTHER THAN A REHASH OF OLD ARGUMENTS IN ITS MOTION TO
RECONSIDER.

A litigant hoping to change a trial court's mind on a motion to reconsider must demonstrate a
reason for the request. In asking the trial court below to reconsider its prior dismissal of Garco's
complaint, Garco asserted that it had presented new evidence, and that it had presented the issues in a
different light. Contrary to Garco's assertion, what Garco had called "new" evidence was not, in fact,
new. Garco had argued this same evidence to the trial court in opposition to Reagan's summary
judgment motion. Nor was the evidence anything that Garco could not have presented to the trial court
at the time of Reagan's summary judgment motion. The evidence was exclusively within Garco's
control, and it concerned facts that had occurred years earlier. With regard to Garco's claim that it had
presented matters in a different light, until it filed its final reply memorandum, all Garco did in its
reconsideration motion was to restate previous theories and elaborate on them. Then, on reply, Garco
improperly raised a series of new arguments and theories, which the trial court correctly struck as
improper rebuttal. Under the circumstances, the trial court's refusal to reconsider its dismissal of
Garco's claims was well within its discretion.
ISSUE 3 -

GARCO FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A TRIAL ON ANY OF
THE CAUSES OF ACTION THAT IT HAD RAISED.

Even if the trial court's December 29, 1997 Order and Judgement were before this Court, the
trial court committed no error in dismissing Garco's claims. In the face of summary judgment, Garco
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had the burden to come forward with facts sufficient to establish its claims. Garco failed to meet this
burden.
With regard to Garco's claims for intentional interference and unfair practices, the trial court
and Reagan had assumed for purposes of Reagan's motion for summary judgment that the facts that
Garco had presented in support of its claims were true. But based on those facts, the trial court correctly
concluded that Reagan was engaging in legitimate competitive activity when it moved its sign to the
Mollerup property. The trial court also correctly concluded that Garco had not presented any evidence
that Reagan had utilized improper means in relocating the sign to its present site. And finally, Garco
had failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence to establish a claim under Utah's Unfair Practices Act.
Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Garco's claims for intentional interference and unfair practices.
The trial court also properly dismissed Garco's trespass claim and unlawful detainer claims.
Reagan was in legal possession of the property when it erected its outdoor advertising sign, and the
written lease with Garco's predecessor specifically allowed Reagan to place the sign, including its
foundation, on the property. The lease did not obligate Reagan to restore the premises to their former
condition when it vacated. Under these circumstances, the law does not make Reagan liable for trespass
for leaving the foundation when it returned possession of the property to Garco. Courts around the
country reject common law trespass claims under similar circumstances, even when a former tenant
leaves hazardous wastes on the property. Reagan simply had no duty under its lease, express or
implied, to remove the foundation.
Because Reagan introduced the sign foundation onto the property during the period of its lease
with Garco's predecessor, the trial court correctly dismissed Garco's trespass claim based on Reagan's
failure to remove the foundation at the end of the lease. In reaching this decision, the trial court did not
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need to reach the issue of whether the lease was binding on Garco. But if it were necessary to reach this
issue, Garco's assertion that it is not subject to the lease is incorrect. Garco had sufficient notice of the
lease at the time it purchased the property to take subject to the terms of the lease. Although Garco
knew that Reagan was leasing the property, Garco chose to rely on the statements it alleges its seller
made about the terms of the lease rather than calling Reagan. Garco's choice did not divest Reagan of
its valuable property right. Nor did Garco ever introduce any facts to support its claim that the lease
was procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Garco initially raised this issue only in its final reply
memorandum in support of its reconsideration motion, and this claim was never properly before the trial
court.
The trial court also correctly rejected Garco's unlawful detainer claim. Reagan removed the sign
face and poles from Garco's property in June 1995, and never thereafter claimed possession to Garco's
property. Garco served its Notice of Unlawful Detainer more than a year later. Under these facts,
Garco failed to state a claim for unlawful detainer.
In the absence of relief on any of the substantive claims, the trial court properly dismissed
Garco's claim for punitive damages.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1 -

BECAUSE GARCO FAILED TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S INITIAL
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW THAT ORDER.

In its Brief, Garco has argued that the trial court allegedly erred in entering its December 29,
1997 Order granting summary judgment and in dismissing Garco's complaint. But Garco did not appeal
the December 29th Order. This Court therefore has no jurisdiction to consider that order. M.L. andS.L.
v. V.K, 894 P.2d 1285, 1286, fn.l (Ut.App. 1995).
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Rule 3(d), U.R. App., requires that a notice of appeal "designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from

" Garco's Notice of Appeal stated that it was appealing "the final order of

the [trial court] entered in this matter on May 1,1998. The appeal is taken from the entire order."4 The
May 1st Order had denied Garco's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 519-20), but made no reference to
the December 29, 1997 Order and Judgment (R.436-40) dismissing Garco's complaint. The purpose
of a Notice of Appeal is to advise the appellate court and the parties what action of the trial court is
being appealed. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 388 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1964). When there
is no reference in the notice of appeal to the order or judgment with which the appellant takes issue, the
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the order or judgment on appeal. M L andS.L. v. V.H.,
894 P.2d at 1286, fn.l (Ut.App. 1995). Thus, the December 29th Order and Judgment is not an issue
on this appeal.
Since Garco appealed only the May 1st Order, Garco is limited to arguing to this Court that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Garco's Motion to Reconsider. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d
694, 697 fn. 2 (Utah App. 1993); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1994)
(trial court has discretion whether to grant a motion to reconsider). An appellate court does not need
to reach the merits of the underlying order to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in refusing to reconsider an order. In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d
42 (Utah App. 1988), the Court found no error in the trial court's refusal to reconsider its initial grant
of summary judgment, Id. at 45, even though the Court went on to overrule the trial court's initial grant

4

In fact, two separate orders were entered by the trial court on May 1, 1998. The first order
denied Garco's Rule 54(b) motion and granted Reagan's motion to strike. The second order
dismissed Reagan's counterclaim based upon the stipulation of the parties. Garco's Notice of
Appeal does not differentiate between those two orders, and it was not clear until Garco filed the
Docketing Statement which of those two orders Garco was appealing.
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of summary judgment. Id. at 45-48. The appellant in that case, in compliance with Rule 3(d),
U.R.App.P., had appealed both the order denying consideration and the initial order granting summary
judgment. Id. at 43. (Certified copies of the James Constructors Notice of Appeal as well as the two
orders from which that appeal was taken are included collectively in Appendix 3 hereto).
Garco did not appeal both the May 1st and December 29th Orders. Garco appealed only the May
1st Order. Thus, pursuant to Rule 3(d), M.L.v. V.H., supra, and James Constructors, the only issue on
appeal in the instant case is whether the May 1st Order was an abuse of trial court's discretion to deny
Garco' s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE 2 -

GARCO DID NOT PRESENT ANY NEW EVIDENCE OR OFFER ANYTHING
OTHER THAN A REHASH OF OLD ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO RECONSIDER.

While motions to reconsider under U.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b) are allowed in multi-party or multiclaim cases when a final judgment has not yet been entered, a litigant hoping to change the trial court's
mind must demonstrate a reason for the request. Factors the trial court may consider include the
following nonexclusive list:
(1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there has
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest injustice"
will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own
errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court.
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,1311 (Utah App. 1994), quoting State v. O 'NeM, 848
P.2d 694, 697, fn. 2 (Utah App.) cert, den., 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Garco asserted to the trial court
(although not until its final Reply Memorandum) that its Motion to Reconsider had presented the
matters in a different light, and that it had presented new evidence that the trial court should consider
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in order to correct its previous errors and avoid injustice (R. 467). Garco's assertion was simply not
correct, as the trial court properly ruled.
A.

GARCO PRESENTED NO NEW EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT AVAILABLE
AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The only "new" evidence that Garco presented in support of its Motion to Reconsider was found
in the affidavits of Elaine Crossley (R.361-64) and Paul Kingston (R.365-80). Both of those affidavits
were filed prior to the November 24, 1997 hearing on Reagan's motion for summary judgment. While
the trial court did indicate that it had not read the affidavits (R.525, p.55), Garco cited to and argued
from the affidavits at the hearing (R.525, pp.9-10). Thus, the affidavits were effectively before the trial
court before it granted Reagan's summary judgment motion.
Even if Garco's counsel had not relied on the affidavits at the hearing on Reagan's motion, this
is not a circumstance that justifies a reconsideration on the basis of new evidence. While no Utah court
has ever squarely addressed the issue of what constitutes new evidence for purposes of Rule 54(b), the
ruling in Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 510 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1973) provides guidance on this
issue. In Hammer, while affirming the trial court's reversal of its prior denial of summary judgment,
the Utah Supreme Court noted that discovery had been conducted between the time of the first and
second motions, resulting in new evidence being presented to the court. Id. at 1105. Thus, the
circumstances presented in the two motions were different, justifying a reconsideration of the trial
court's prior ruling. Id. In attempting to determine what constitutes new evidence for purposes of a
statutory juvenile court termination proceeding, the Utah Supreme Court has relied on the case law that
addresses the issue for purposes of retrial under Rule 59(a)(4), U.R.Civ.P.:
Evidence must meet several requirements to qualify as newly discovered evidence under
Rule 59(a)(4). In Barson v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah 1984), we stated
that the moving party must show that the evidence has three characteristics in order for a new
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trial to be granted. First, it must be material, competent evidence which is in fact newly
discovered. Second, it must be such that it could not, by due diligence, have been discovered
and produced at trial
In Interest ofS.R., 735 P.2d 53, 57 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, no discovery took place between the time the trial court dismissed Garco's
claims and the time Garco moved the trial court to reconsider. The evidence was such that it was
exclusively within Garco's control.5 And it was evidence concerning facts that had occurred years
earlier (R.361-80). Had Garco wished to present this evidence in opposition to Reagan's initial motion
for summary judgment, it had every opportunity to do so. Garco had almost a full year to prepare its
case before Reagan filed its motion for summary judgment. Garco then presented some 70 pages of
opposition to Reagan's motion (R. 196-267). The purported "new" evidence that Garco submitted on
reconsideration was exclusively within Garco's control and fully available to Garco at the time it
presented its opposition to Reagan's motion. The affidavits that Garco urged the trial court to consider
on reconsideration do not qualify as newly discovered evidence sufficient to require the trial court to
reconsider its prior ruling.
B.

GARCO'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER WAS LARGELY JUST A REHASH OF
ARGUMENTS IT HAD MADE EARLIER TO THE TRIAL COURT.

As for Garco's assertion that it had presented matters in a different light, the Utah Supreme
Court's ruling in Bd. of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah
1983) is instructive. In that case, the trial court initially entered summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on liability, reserving damages for trial. Id. at 1032. The plaintiff later amended its complaint

5

Affiant Paul Kingston had been an agent of Garco's (R. 365), and apparently has a familial
relationship with Joseph Kingston, Garco's property manager (R.258), and Carl Kingston, Garco's
attorney during the lease negotiations (R.253). Affiant Elaine Crossley is an officer of Garco
(R.361).
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and changed its recovery theory. Id. At trial, a second trial judge reversed the previous grant of
summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. The Utah Supreme Court
noted that the new theory that the plaintiff had asserted did not affect the basic issue of liability, and
held that the second trial judge had erred in reversing the first grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1033.
In the instant matter, the only issues before the trial court on reconsideration were those raised in the
complaint and dismissed on summary judgment. Until it filed its reply memorandum in support of its
reconsideration motion, all Garco did in its reconsideration motion was to incorporate previously raised
theories and elaborate on them.
With regard to Garco's trespass theory, Garco argued on reconsideration that Reagan had no
binding written lease with Garco, and that Reagan's duties could not be defined by the lease Reagan
had with Garco's predecessor (R.442). Garco had presented this same point to the trial court in oral
argument in its opposition to Reagan's motion (R.525, p.8-10). Garco argued on reconsideration that
Reagan had agreed in a letter to remove the foundation (R. 442-43). Again, Garco presented this same
argument to the trial court at the hearing on Reagan's motion (R.525, p.l 1-12). In its reconsideration
motion, Garco argued that the lease contained "implied terms," such as a duty to not commit waste,
which would impose a duty on Reagan to remove the foundation (R.443-45). Garco had argued the
same point to the trial court at the hearing (R.525, p. 14).
With regard to the unlawful detainer claim, Garco stood steadfastly by the argument that it had
made in its initial opposition to Reagan's motion, i.e., that the presence of the foundation on Garco's
property means that Reagan is in continuing possession of Garco's property (R.445-46; R.210-11). The
trial court had already considered and rejected Garco's argument (R.437). Garco's reference in its
reconsideration motion to federal and state antitrust acts (R.446-47) was not its first mention of those
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statutes. Garco had raised them in its initial opposition to Reagan's motion (R.214). The trial court did
not err in refusing to set aside its prior grant of summary judgment solely because Garco had elaborated
on the alleged application of the antitrust statutes to Garco's claims.6
Frankly, in light of the fact that all Garco did in its reconsideration motion was to elaborate on
arguments that it had previously made, the trial court would have abused its discretion had it chosen
to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 551 P.2d 244 (Nev. 1976), cited in
Bd. of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033 (second trial judge
abused discretion in overruling first since only distinguishing feature between two motions was citation
of additional authority). As the trial court correctly noted, Garco's arguments "essentially rehash[ed]"
arguments that the trial court had already fully considered and rejected. (R.513).
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY STRUCK THE NEW ARGUMENTS THAT
GARCO RAISED IN ITS REPLY MEMORANDUM.

Garco raised a series of new arguments and theories in its final Reply Memorandum filed in
support of its Motion to Reconsider, which the trial court properly struck pursuant to the principles of
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Ut. App. 1993). As stated in that case, it is incumbent upon
a movant to include within its principal supporting memorandum all issues on which it believes it is
entitled to prevail. State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1003-04 (Ut. App. 1993), quoting White v.
Kent Medical Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. App. 1991). In Phathammavong, the Utah Court of
Appeals found that a movant's argument raised for the first time in a reply memorandum was not
properly before the trial court.

6

In any event, as the federal court rejected Garco's claims under the Sherman Act (Appendix
2), Garco's state antitrust claims would be similarly rejected under U.C.A. §76-10-926.
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Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the
nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond. It is for this reason that, in the analogous area
of appellate review, the rule is well settled that the court will not consider issues raised for the
first time in a reply brief.
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1003-04. As noted in Phathammavong, Rule 202(b)(2),
U.S.Dist.Ct., D.Utah, limits reply memoranda to rebutting matters raised in the memorandum opposing
the motion, as does Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Phathammavong, 860
P.2d at 1004. Additionally, as the Phathammavong court noted, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)
explains that "rebuttal evidence is restricted to 'explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in
evidence by the opposing party/" State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004. Thus, it is error for a
court to consider issues raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. Id.
Substantial portions of Garco' s reply memorandum filed in support of its reconsideration motion
consisted of new argument raised for the first time:
1.

Points "D" and "E" consisted of arguments that relied in whole on an assertion

completely unsupported by the record that Reagan did not remove its sign from Garco's property until
July 19, 1995, after the lease expired (R.473-74). Prior to filing the Reply Memo, Garco had admitted
that the sign was removed in June 1995. (R.387/P0; R. 133,124 in conjunction with R. 199,^24 and
R.203,^45). Until its Reply Memo, Garco had never asserted that the sign was still in place after June
19th, and certainly not after July 8, 1995, the deadline referenced in Garco's own notice to Reagan to
remove the sign (R. 185). The Phathammavong court squarely rejected a similar effort to alter key dates
at the last moment ~ in that case, in a reply memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss, the
defendant suggested a different key operative date than that which he had previously argued. The
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Phathammavong court held that the trial court was correct in disregarding this new assertion. The trial
court's similar prohibition in this case was appropriate.7 Points "D" and "E" were properly stricken.
2.

In Point "B," Garco argued that the written lease between Reagan and Garco was an

unenforceable "adhesion contract." (R.469-71). Garco admitted in its reply brief that it had never
before analyzed this issue (R.469). The issue was not raised or argued in Garco's principal
memorandum filed in support of its Motion to Revise Order, and Garco offered no facts in support of
its procedural or substantive unconscionability argument. (See Section III.C.5., infra, at pps. 44-46).
Since Garco argued the issue for the first time in its reply, Garco's Point "B" was properly stricken
under the principles of Phathammavong.
3.

Garco's Point "F" was an entirely new argument regarding public policy (R.475). To

the extent it characterized Reagan's foundation as "waste," pursuant to Utah's environmental quality
administrative procedures, it raised factual issues that were never addressed by either of the parties at
any time. For example, Reagan never had an opportunity to demonstrate that the foundation is "fill
material" or "inert waste," which are materials that are excluded from the purview of the environmental
regulations that Garco cited. (See footnote 15, infra). The trial court properly struck this argument.
4.

The trial court also properly struck Point II, as that point relied on Garco's Points "B,"

"D," "E," and "F" (R.476).

7

Garco asserts on appeal that Points "D" and "E" points only went to Garco's argument that a
Reagan letter had clarified a contract ambiguity (Garco's Brief, p. 37). However, a review of
Garco's reply memorandum belies that claim. In Point "D", Garco argued that because Reagan's
sign was still on the property after July 19th, Reagan had forfeited any contractual right to remove
the sign (R.474). And in Point "E", Garco asserted that the trial court had "not adequately considered
the timing of Reagan's acts, or the undisputed fact that even under Reagan's theory of the case
Reagan had already stayed in possession beyond the time it had to vacate." Id.
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Garco asserts that it raised these arguments to rebut "Reagan's argument that the trial court had
already 'heard and ruled upon most if not all of the facts and legal arguments that Garco now seeks to
have the Court reconsider.'" (Garco's Brief, p. 37). Therefore, Garco claims, the reply memorandum
only "illustrated] arguments Garco had raised, but were not argued or ruled on," (Garco's Brief, p. 37).
This is incorrect. As demonstrated above, the reply memorandum raised new, substantive arguments
that had never before been raised or considered. The Reagan argument which Garco claims to have
been rebutting did not open the door to a whole host of new issues. In rebuttal of Reagan's argument,
Garco was limited to demonstrating, if it could, that the arguments that it had made in its principal
memorandum were new (which they were not).
Finally, contrary to Garco's assertion, the trial court did not rely on the stricken arguments when
it denied Garco's motion to reconsider. In accordance with Phathammavong, it simply and properly
disregarded them (R.513).
ISSUE 3 -

GARCO FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A TRIAL ON ANY OF
THE CAUSES OF ACTION THAT IT HAD RAISED.

Even if the trial court's December 29,1997 Order and Judgment were before this Court, the trial
court committed no error in dismissing Garco's claims. Garco failed to present sufficient evidence to
show that Reagan's movement of the sign to the neighboring property was anything other than
legitimate competitive activity. Garco also presented no evidence to support its assertion that the means
by which Reagan accomplished that move were improper. And Garco presented no evidence at all in

8

To the extent Garco asserts that the Order the trial court signed in this regard did not accurately
reflect the trial court's minute entry (Garco's Brief, p. 36), Garco itself approved the Order as to form
(R.520).
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support of its Unfair Practices Act claim. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly dismissed
Garco's claims for intentional interference and unfair practices.
As for Garco's trespass and unlawful detainer claims, Reagan was in legal possession of the
property at the time the foundation was placed on the property, and Reagan had no duty to remove it
at the end of its tenancy. Common law trespass principles do not apply under these circumstances.
Thus, whether Garco purchased the property subject to the terms of the lease between Reagan and
Garco's predecessor is irrelevant to dismissal of Garco's trespass claim. In any event, Garco had
sufficient notice at the time it purchased the property to take subject to the terms of the lease between
Reagan and Garco's predecessor. Reagan vacated the property when it moved its sign to the
neighboring property, and the trial court properly dismissed Garco's trespass and unlawful detainer
claims. The claim for punitive damages was properly dismissed when all substantive causes of action
were dismissed.
A.

THE FACTS THAT GARCO PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM FOR
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS WERE
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
REAGAN HAD COMMITTED THE TORT.

In order to recover under its theory of intentional interference with economic relations, Garco
had the burden of convincing the trial court that (a) Reagan had intentionally interfered with Garco's
potential economic relations, (b) that Reagan's alleged interference was carried out for an improper
purpose or by improper means, and (c) that Reagan's act was the cause of Garco's alleged injury.
Leigh Furniture v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).
On summary judgment, the trial court was required to view the evidence that Garco presented
in support of this claim through the prism of Garco's substantive evidentiary burden. Anderson v.
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986).9 After review of all of the evidence
that Garco had presented, the trial court ruled that Garco had failed to present sufficient evidence of an
improper purpose or improper means (R.438-39). Thus, Garco failed to prove element (b) of the tort.10
1.

The Evidence That Garco Presented In Support of its "Improper Purpose"
Claim Was Sufficient Only to Demonstrate that Reagan's Move of the Sign
Was Legitimate Competitive Activity.

The trial court first rejected Garco's claim of intentional interference with economic relations
on the basis of the improper purpose prong of the Leigh case, stating:
[E]ven if the Court implies as true that [Reagan's] purpose in locating the sign as it did on the
neighboring property was to prevent [Garco] from erecting its own sign, there is no evidence
that any injury to [Garco] occasioned by [Reagan's] move of the sign to the neighboring
property was an end in and of itself, designed to harm [Garco] merely for the sake of injury
alone. Instead, [Reagan's] move of the sign to its present location constituted legitimate
competitive activity, consistent with an effort by [Reagan] to achieve the long-range economic
goal of maximizing its profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling
competitive activity on [Garco's] property. Thus, there is no evidence of improper purpose.
(R.438).

9

One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims and defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for
the rights of persons asserting claims, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims to
demonstrate in the manner provided by Rule 56, prior to trial, that the claims have no factual basis.
Celotex Corp., supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2555. Garco had the burden of coming forward with facts, under
oath, as required by Rule 56(e), U.R.Civ.P., to establish its claim. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1988); Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086
(Utah 1988).
10

Reagan never admitted to element (a) of the tort, but rather presented evidence that Reagan's
placement of the Mollerup sign was dictated by the owner of the adjacent property (R. 187-89).
Reagan further denied that it had told Garco that it would move the sign in order to prevent Garco
from doing business with anyone but Reagan (R.430,lf3; R.385,^20). The evidence being in dispute,
Reagan did not seek summary judgment on that element.
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In finding a lack of evidence to show improper purpose, the trial court relied on Leigh's
explanation of the improper purpose prong. In Leigh, the Utah Supreme Court had first noted that there
was substantial evidence Leigh Corporation had deliberately injured Isom's economic relations. But
the Utah Supreme Court ruled, as a matter of law, that Leigh Corporation's actions had not been taken
for an improper purpose:
. . . [T]hat injury was not an end in itself. It was an intermediate step toward achieving the longrange financial goal of profitably reselling the building free of Isom's interest. Because that
economic interest seems to have been controlling, we must conclude that the evidence in this
case would not support a jury finding that the Corporation's predominant purpose was to
injure or ruin Isom 's business merely for the sake of injury alone.
Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d at 308 (emphasis added). Thus, the Leigh Court found that in acting
to further a legitimate and controlling long-range financial goal, one does not violate the improper
purpose element of the tort -- even if one of the actor's purposes is to harm another's business. Id.
The improper purpose prong of Leigh has been reviewed by Utah appellate courts only twice
since the case was decided. In Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme
Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of Pratt on the improper purpose prong, noting that Prodata, Inc.
had evidenced "consistent and open hostility" toward Pratt, Id. at 789, that Prodata, Inc. had taken
advantage of "personal leverage that it apparently had with UDOT [Pratt's employer] by inducing
UDOT to fire Pratt," Id. at 791, and that Prodata, Inc. had utilized a non-compete covenant (that had
expired) "to threaten substantial liability and to demand a substantial payment from Pratt when it knew
it had not suffered any actual damages from Pratt's breach [of the covenant]." Id. at 789. The Pratt
Court noted that Prodata, Inc. had taken these actions even though the non-compete covenant had
already expired and could no longer be used to prevent Pratt from working at UDOT. Id. On these
facts, the Pratt Court found that the jury "could have found something akin to extortion in [Prodata,
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Inc.'s] motivation." Id. A review of the facts in Pratt reveals no economic justification at all for
Prodata, Inc.'s actions -- Prodata, Inc. had suffered no harm as a result of Pratt's breach of the noncompete covenant. Id. at 789. Prodata, Inc. was simply acting gratuitously by contacting UDOT to
harm Pratt. Id at 791.
Similarly, in Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1997), during
the ongoing course of a dispute between Promax and Mattson over the construction costs for building
a home, Mattson listed the home for sale and procured a buyer. Id. at 250-51. When advised of the
sale, Promax insisted that it was entitled to a real estate commission, and threatened to "kill the deal"
if Mattson did not acquiesce. Id. at 251. When Mattson refused, Promax encouraged several material
suppliers to file mechanics liens on the home, and the buyer backed out of the deal as a result. Id. The
Promax Court noted that Promax had not looked to enforce any contract regarding commissions that
it felt might have existed between itself and Mattson, but had instead "used its leverage and connections
with the material suppliers to harm Mattson." Id. at 255. The lack of economic justification for
Promax's actions in Promax is even more glaring than in Pratt. In Promax, by killing the deal, the only
result was harm to Mattson - while Mattson would lose the sale as a result of Promax's interference,
the interference did not result in Promax procuring any commission.
As noted in Leigh, when the actor is primarily motivated by advancing his own economic
interests, there is no tort:
Because it requires that the improper purpose predominate, this alternative takes the long
view of the defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be eclipsed by
legitimate long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, much competitive commercial activity,
such as a businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range
economic interests, could become tortious. In the rough and tumble of the marketplace,
competitors inevitably damage one another in the struggle for personal advantage. The law
offers no remedy for those damages - even if intentional - because they are an inevitable byproduct of competition.
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Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d at 307'.
The decision in which Leigh had its genesis was Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
582 P.2d 1365,1372 (Or. 1978). In that case, the Oregon Supreme Court could not, as a matter of law,
find any improper purpose in Allstate's discouraging its claimants from taking their automobiles to Top
Service's shop. After a dispute between Allstate and Top Service, Allstate adjusters actively
discouraged its claimants from taking work to Top Service. Id. Allstate began disparaging the quality
of Top Service's work, and on at least one occasion, opted to total a car rather than have it repaired at
Top Service. Id. Allstate also began actively directing its insurance claimants to Top Service's
competitors. Id. But as the Oregon Supreme Court noted in affirming the trial court's judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, %\ . . these acts were wholly consistent with Allstate's pursuit of its own
business purposes as it saw them and did not suffice to support an inference of the alleged improper
purpose to injure Top Service." Id. Similarly, in BirkenwaldDistributing Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 776
P.2d 721 (Wash.App. 1989), the appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of liquor distributor's
claim of intentional interference against its supplier. The supplier had refused to approve the
distributor's proposed transferee, instead choosing a different transferee, and had thus forced the
distributor to sell its business at a discount. Id. at 727. Noting that the supplier had every right to select
the replacement distributor of its choice, the court found:
Asserting one's rights to maximize economic interests does not create an inference of ill will
or improper purpose. . . . The purpose was not improper because there was no evidence that
[the supplier] asserted its right for any reason other than to select a replacement distributor of
its own choice. Because [the distributor] lost nothing to which it was entitled, and because it
failed to raise an inference of improper purpose, dismissal was proper.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In the case at bar, Garco introduced the following evidence in support of its allegation that
Reagan's purpose in placing the sign as it did was to harm Garco:
(a)

That Reagan indicated that if Garco did not enter into a lease with Reagan on

Reagan's terms, Reagan would remove its sign and erect another within 500 feet of Garco's
southern boundary, so that Garco could not do business with anyone but Reagan (Garco's Brief,
p. 29).
(b)

That Reagan did, in fact, remove its sign from Garco's property and erect another

within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary, although it could have chosen a different location
that would have allowed Garco to do business with one of Reagan's competitors (Garco's Brief,
p.30). 11
(c)

That after Reagan removed its Garco sign, it told Garco that it would still like

to explore the possibility of locating an outdoor advertising sign on Garco's property (Garco's
Brief, pps. 30-31).12
11

Reagan admitted these facts only for purposes of summary judgment (R.130). But Reagan
denied that it had told Garco that it intended to prevent Garco from doing business with anyone but
Reagan, (R.430,P; R.385,^f20), and submitted testimony from James Mollerup, the owner of the
adjacent property, that it was Mr. Mollerup, and not Reagan, who had dictated the placement of
Reagan's sign on the Mollerup property (R. 187-89). Nevertheless, for purposes of the summary
judgment motion, Reagan and the trial court both assumed that Garco's allegations in this regard
were true (R.130; R.438).
12

Garco offers additional "evidence" on appeal in support of its argument that Reagan's purpose
was improper, asserting that in maximizing its profits, Reagan could have contracted with Garco's
neighbor to the south for a sign, and that other sign companies can still compete for a lease on that
property. (Garco's Brief, p. 32). Garco's assertion is sheer speculation that ignores the myriad of
factors that would go into a decision by Reagan, Reagan's competitors, and/or Garco's southern
neighbor regarding the placement of a sign on the southern property. And frankly, the potential
availability of the southern property for a sign site is evidence of Reagan's economic concerns rather
than its alleged intent to harm Garco. The southern property would have been completely
unavailable to Reagan had the Mollerup sign been placed so that Garco could contract with a
(continued...)
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As the trial court properly found, none of this evidence supports an inference of anything other than
"legitimate competitive activity, consistent with an effort by [Reagan] to achieve the long-range
economic goal of maximizing its profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling
competitive activity on [Garco's] property." (R. 438). Contrary to Garco's assertions, it can only be
inferred from the evidence that Garco presented, and in particular from Reagan's continued efforts to
work with Garco to negotiate a lease, that Reagan did not intend to harm Garco, but instead wanted the
opportunity to earn as much advertising revenue as it could generate from signs in the area. Of the
three scenarios which might have occurred at the time Reagan moved its sign from Garco's property
to the Mollerup property, the most valuable to Reagan would obviously be having two signs in the area,
one on Mollerup's northern property boundary and one on Garco's southern property boundary, with
income streams from both. Reagan's continued negotiations with Garco after it moved the sign to the
Mollerup property are evidence of Reagan's desire and intent to implement this most valuable scenario.
The second most valuable scenario to Reagan would be to have the only sign in the area — economic
principles of supply and demand would operate to allow Reagan to maximize its profits from the sign.
The least valuable scenario to Reagan is the one that Garco proposes Reagan had a duty to provide a Reagan sign on the Mollerup property and a competitor's sign on the Garco property. Pursuant to that

(...continued)
competitor. Absent Garco's speculation, the record evidence supports the availability of only two
sign sites in the vicinity, i.e., one on the Mollerup property and one on Garco's property. As for
Garco's assertion that Reagan evidenced an improper purpose by leaving the sign foundation in
place, there is not even a hint of evidence to indicate that the presence of the sign foundation
prevented Garco from contracting with Reagan's competitors or that the presence of the foundation
has harmed Garco in any way. Instead, the record reflects that Garco continues to utilize the
foundation for parking. (R. 168).
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scenario, supply and demand no longer maximizes Reagan's profits, and the income stream from the
Garco sign would go to Reagan's competitors. Leigh does not dictate such a result.
As Justices Stewart and Durham noted in Pratt, the improper purpose prong of Leigh must be
applied narrowly in the context of commercial dealings:
[I]f construed broadly, [the improper purpose prong] could seriously interfere with the forces
of competition in the marketplace when competitors seek to take business away from others by
lowering prices or by blaming other means that harm a competitor. Certainly, such commercial
conduct cases " do not fall within the scope of an improper-purpose test when the conduct is
legitimate competitive conduct, such as is recognized under the antitrust laws.
Pratt v. Prodata, 885 P.2d at 790 (J.Stewart, J.Durham concurring) (emphasis added). Justice
Zimmerman, who wrote the main opinion in Pratt, expressed "grave doubts about the future vitality
of Leigh's improper purpose prong, especially in the context of commercial dealings," and warned that
Leigh has potential for misuse. Id. at 798, fn.3.
Garco's complaint against Reagan is a prime example of misuse of the tort. Unlike the actors
in Pratt and Prodata, Reagan did not actively contact a third party to interfere with Garco's prospective
or actual economic relations. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Garco, the facts evidence
that Reagan only placed the Mollerup sign in such a way that the 500 foot restrictions of the Outdoor
Advertising Act would prevent Garco from contracting with Reagan's competitors. Reagan used the
Mollerup property in a legal manner for outdoor advertising. Reagan's alleged conduct is no different
from, for example, tavern owners who compete to hold liquor licenses in a strip mall. Assuming that
regulatory spacing requirements would allow one licensee at each end of the mall, the smart tavern
owner would lease space in the center of the mall, thus precluding any of his competitors from leasing
space in the mall. This is not improper conduct, but a "struggle for personal advantage" in the "rough
and tumble of the marketplace." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307.
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Garco asserts that this is anti-competitive conduct prohibited by the state's antitrust statutes.
To the contrary, Chief Judge David Sam of the United States District Court for the District of Utah
summarily dismissed Garco's federal antitrust claims against Reagan in August 1998 (Appendix 2).
Because Utah's antitrust statute would be interpreted in a comparable manner pursuant to U.C.A. §7610-926, Judge Sam's unappealed decision conclusively establishes that Reagan's (alleged) conduct is
legitimate competitive conduct recognized and permitted under the antitrust laws. Competitive conduct
that is permitted under the antitrust laws cannot be punished as tortious interference. Pratt v. Prodata,
885 P.2d at 790 (J.Stewart, J.Durham concurring); Willamette Dental Group v. Oregon Dental Service
Corp., 882 P.2d 637, 644 (Or.App. 1994).
Reagan had a right, when it could not contract with Garco on favorable terms, to move its sign
to the neighboring property, where the landowner was, in fact, willing to lease its property on
acceptable terms. Assuming that Reagan did, in fact, choose the placement of the sign on the Mollerup
property, Reagan had a right, in furtherance of "maximiz[ing its] economic interests," Birkenwald, 776
P.2d at 727, to take advantage of the 500 foot requirements and place the Mollerup sign so as to prevent
a competitor from erecting an outdoor advertising sign on the Garco property. "[A] businessman's
efforts to forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range economic interests" is not an
improper purpose. Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308. The trial court's ruling that there was no evidence
of improper purpose was supported by the record and was entirely correct.
2.

Garco Failed to Present Any Evidence to Support Its Assertion That The
Means by Which Reagan Prevented a Competing Sign from Being Erected
on the Garco Property Were Improper.

Garco offers three arguments in support of its contention that Reagan acted by improper means
in preventing Garco from competing. None of those arguments is valid.
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First, Garco asserts that Reagan violated UDOT regulations in the process of erecting and
obtaining permits for its Mollerup sign (Garco's Brief, p. 33). Garco offered no evidence to the trial
court to support that argument, but only speculation and uncertified copies of UDOT records that Garco
had attached to a memorandum (R.345-48). The only evidence before the trial court on this point was
from the UDOT official who had supervised Reagan's permitting process, who attested that Reagan
had, in fact, complied in all respects with UDOT's rules and regulations in moving its sign to the
Mollerup property. (R.406-17). Moreover, as the trial court ruled, there was no evidence that the
alleged violation of UDOT's regulations was the cause of Garco's inability to procure its own permit:
The Court notes that it is undisputed that after lengthy lease negotiations between [Garco and
Reagan], on February 23, 1995, [Garco] advised [Reagan] that it had "elected to pursue other
options" and demanded that [Reagan] immediately remove the sign. [Reagan] contracted with
the neighboring property owner on April 20, 1995, and applied to UDOT to move the sign
shortly thereafter. There is no evidence that [Garco] took any substantial steps during that
interim period to attempt to secure its own permit for a competing sign. Nor is there any
evidence before the Court that [Reagan's] R-407 permit was improperly granted or that
[Reagan's] two signs being erected at the same time for some three weeks caused any injury to
[Garco]. Therefore, there is no evidence that [Reagan] acted by improper means in moving its
sign to the neighboring property or that [Reagan's] act in moving the sign was the cause of
[Garco's] inability to procure its own permit.
(R.438). In its Brief, Garco does not explain how this ruling is erroneous (Garco's Brief, p. 33). Garco
really only asserts that on the basis of some confusion about the process by which Reagan obtained its
permit for the Mollerup sign — confusion that UDOT's own permits officer explained and corrected
(R.406-17) -- Reagan is guilty of tortious interference with Garco's economic relations. The trial court
was entirely correct in ruling that the permitting process did not evidence improper means.
Second, Garco asserts that improper means are evidenced in Reagan's alleged trespass on
Garco's property. Garco's argument on this point is confusing. If Garco is relying on Reagan's
conduct in allegedly "lull[ing] Garco into inaction" (Garco's Brief, p. 34), Garco does not explain how
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this alleged conduct affected its ability to contract with a Reagan competitor. Moreover, as noted in
the trial court's December Order, "[Garco] abandoned its argument that the lease negotiations. . .
constituted improper means." (R.438). At oral argument, Garco's counsel had stated that, "Garco never
claimed that so-called lulling constitutes an improper means." (R.525, p.34). Thus, the lease
negotiations between Garco and Reagan cannot constitute alleged improper means for purposes of
Garco's appeal. If, instead, Garco is relying on Reagan's continued possession of the property after
Garco purchased the property. Garco admitted that that possession was by oral agreement or as a tenant
at will (R.198,^13). Garco's notice to remove the sign, which was given in February 1995, told Reagan
to remove the sign by July 8, 1995 (R.185). Thus, Reagan's possession during this time period could
not be a trespass. If Garco is instead relying on the continuing presence of the sign foundation after
June 1995, there is no hint of evidence in the record that the foundation had any effect at all on Garco's
ability to contract with any of Reagan's competitors.
Finally, Garco asserts that Reagan's act constituted conduct forbidden by the Utah Antitrust Act.
As set forth above, Garco's identical claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act was summarily dismissed
by the federal court pursuant to the state action doctrine (Appendix 2). In construing whether Reagan's
conduct violated the Utah Antitrust Act, this Court must "be guided by interpretations given by the
federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes...." U.C.A. §76-10-926. Judge Sam's finding
that Reagan's alleged anti-competitive conduct was immune from federal antitrust laws conclusively
establishes that Reagan's alleged conduct is does not violate the state antitrust statute. Competitive
conduct that is permitted under the antitrust laws cannot be punished as tortious interference.
Willamette Dental Group v. Oregon Dental Service Corp., 882 P.2d 637,644 (Or.App. 1994). The trial
court did not err in finding that Garco failed to present evidence of improper means.
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B.

GARCO OFFERED NOT A SHRED OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM
UNDER THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT

Garco never offered any evidence at all to show that Reagan violated the Unfair Practices Act.
The purpose of the Act is to foster and encourage competition. U.C.A. §13-5-7. What the Act prohibits
is price discrimination, §13-5-3, and sales at less than cost, §13-5-7. Garco never even alleged, much
less offered evidence, that Reagan had engaged in price discrimination or sold anything at less than cost.
The trial court correctly dismissed this claim.
C.

THE LEASE PURSUANT TO WHICH REAGAN INSTALLED THE SIGN ON
THE PROPERTY DID NOT OBLIGATE REAGAN TO REMOVE THE
FOUNDATION.

The trial court also correctly ruled that Reagan had not trespassed on Garco's property and that
Reagan was not liable to Garco for unlawful detainer by failing to remove the foundation from Garco's
real property. It was undisputed below that in 1975, Reagan leased the property from Garco's
predecessors-in-interest for the purpose of erecting and maintaining an outdoor advertising sign on the
subject property. (R.l). It was also undisputed that Reagan placed the outdoor advertising sign,
including its foundation, on the property pursuant to its rights under the lease (R.l91-93; Garco's Brief,
p. 6, T|l). The purpose of the lease was to allow Reagan to erect an outdoor sign in order to utilize the
property for outdoor advertising (R.l93). The lease gave Reagan the right to move or change the sign
at any time (R.l93). But the lease did not obligate Reagan to remove the sign or the foundation at the
end of the lease term or to restore the premises to their pre-lease condition. In the absence of such
duties, the actions of which Garco has complained are not trespass, nor do they constitute the basis for
an unlawful detainer claim, as the trial court correctly ruled.

32

1.

There is No Cause of Action for Trespass When the Actor is in Legal
Possession of the Property at the Time the Alleged Harm is Introduced.

As Garco has noted in its Brief, the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that one is subject
to liability for trespass if he "fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove."
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §158 (emphasis added). It follows that in the absence of such a duty,
one cannot be held liable for trespass.
In determining whether a tenant has a duty at the end of a lease to remove structures that the
tenant has erected during the term of the lease, courts look to the purposes of the lease and to its terms.
For instance, in Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 227 P.2d 88 (Kan. 1951), the defendant leased real
property from the plaintiff to utilize as a site to construct tanks, power stations, pipelines and other
structures for use in the tenant's operation of a tank and pump station. Id. at 89. In furtherance of those
purposes, the tenant had built, maintained, and utilized certain buildings and improvements on the
property for a number of years before the lease terminated. Id. at 90. On termination of the lease, the
tenant failed to remove:
. . . several hundred feet of concrete sidewalks, concrete foundations for five or six dwelling
houses, concrete foundations for four or five garages, concrete foundations for pumps and
powers; and failed to take up and remove several hundred feet of pipe lines; failed to tear down
and level the banks of earth tanks; failed to remove large quantities of broken concrete, stones,
bricks, iron pipes and other similar refuse; failed to remove and destroy noxious weeds, grasses,
trees, vines, and shrubs; failed to remove oil that had been permitted to flow or be spilled on the
soil; failed to fill ditches, sumps, ponds, and other holes and depressions on said leased land,
and failed to remove gravel and chat placed thereon for use in roadways and drives.
Id. at 90. The lessor sued to recover damages resulting from the tenant's failure to remove these items
it had placed on the property during its tenancy and to restore the premises to their pre-lease condition.
The appellate court reviewed the lease between the parties, and then, relying on case law from
Oklahoma, Texas and Kansas, upheld the trial court's demurrer of the complaint:

33

Considering the expressed purpose of the lease, plaintiff was bound to know that the
lessee, in furtherance thereof, would erect buildings, tanks, pipelines and all other things
necessary for the operation of the business at hand. In fact, the right to erect such improvements
was granted, but nowhere in the contract is there any provision requiring lessee, upon
termination of the lease, to restore the premises to their former condition. As we read this lease
contract, defendant lessee was under no duty at any time to remove any of its property. It was
given the right and option to do so if it so desired, but nowhere is plaintiff lessor given the right
to enforce removal. 7/ therefore follows that since plaintiff had no right to enforce removal he
is in no position to complain of the partial removal, which was done under contract right of
lessee so to do, in the absence of negligence in accomplishing such partial removal. Had the
parties desired to contract that upon termination of the lease defendant would be required to
remove all of its property and to restore the premises to their former condition, they could have
done so, but here the only covenant touching removal of the property is the one giving lessee
the right to remove if it so desires.
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Sherman Co. v. United States of America, 258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958), the United
States government had leased the plaintiffs land as a military post, and constructed a number of
buildings and other structures having concrete foundations. The lease stated that the structures would
remain the property of the United States, "and may be removed therefrom by the Government prior to
the termination of this lease." Id. at 882 (J.Hamley, concurring). When the lease expired, the buildings
were removed, but the government left the foundations in place. Rejecting the landowner's claim for
damages, the Ninth Circuit noted that:
The lease in question gave the Government the right to remove improvements at the
expiration of the lease, but not the duty to do so. There is no express covenant requiring the
Government to restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the beginning of
the term. Under these circumstances, there is no implied covenant of the kind suggested by [the
landowner].
Id. (J.Hamley, concurring).13
13

Garco attempted below to distinguish Duvanel and Sherman by asserting that the lessees in
those cases did not retain ownership of the improvements (R.209-10). In fact, both of the lessees
in those cases did retain ownership of the improvements. Sherman Co. v. United States of America,
258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958) (paragraph 8 of the lease stated, "...fixtures, additions, or structures so
(continued...)
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See, also, Fox v. Cities Service Oil Co., 200 P.2d 398 (Ok. 1948) (no implied covenant to remove
foundations or concrete slabs necessary to lessee's placing and operation of its building); Amoco
Production Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 896-97 (N.M. 1985) (New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed appellate court's imposition of implied contractual duty to restore the surface estate following
cessation of drilling operations).

(...continued)
placed upon or attached to the premises shall be and remain the property of the Government and may
be removed therefrom by the Government..."); Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 227 P.2d 88, 89
(Kan. 1951) (lessee entitled to remove all improvements at any time).
Garco also attempted below to distinguish Sherman by arguing that the lessor had expressly
relieved the lessee of restoration responsibility. (R.472). But the Sherman court specifically noted
that "the Government would be free of liability even in the absence of a covenant expressly relieving
it of responsibility for restoring the premises." Sherman v. U.S., 258 F.2d at 882-83.
Garco also argued to the trial court that Duvenal was questionable authority, asserting that the
court in Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1986) had noted a trend
to reverse older cases not recognizing a duty to restore. (R.210). Garco failed to recognize, however,
that the court in that case was deeply divided on that issue. The dissenting opinion, recognizing that
other jurisdictions had enacted legislation to create the duty, noted that:
Other jurisdictions having no legislation covering the matter hold that there is no
implied duty upon the mineral lessee to restore the surface. Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Texas 1957); Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farms, 703 P.2d
894 (N.M. 1985).
I find no evidence whatever of the "changes in the viewpoint of courts." While I find
some evidence of the legislative trend, I find the judicial one exists only in the hopes and
dreams of the authors cited in the majority opinion. In my view we have no business making
a blatant change in the law of mineral leases. Rather, I agree with the conclusion of the
author of one article cited by the majority: "The best solution to this problem seems to be the
adoption of a statute, similar to the Kansas and Illinois statutes, requiring restoration of the
premises upon completion of operations." L. Davis, Selected Problems Regarding Lessee's
Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst, at 349 (1963).
Bonds v. Sanchez-0 'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d at 447. Even Garco recognized below that
a remedial statute was required in Kansas to overrule Duvenal and to place a duty on the lessee to
remove the improvements at the end of the lease (R.210).
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While Utah has not addressed the specific issue, courts around the nation have rejected efforts
to establish a trespass action under circumstances in which real property is even more permanently
changed by the actions of a prior party who had been lawfully in possession of the property at the time
the change was wrought. A large body of law has developed over who has the ultimate responsibility
to clean up hazardous wastes left on real property, an issue that has far greater impact on property than
the inert foundation that remained on Garco's property at the termination of Reagan's lease. The courts
have held that while the original actor may be liable under federal and/or state statutes for the cleanup,
there can be no cause of action stated for common-law trespass, as the actor was legally entitled to be
in possession of the property when the action was taken. For example, in Wellesley Hills Realty Trust
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F.Supp. 93 (D.Mass. 1990), Mobil Oil owned the real property and operated
a gas station on it for many years. During this period, hazardous materials were released on the
property. Mobil eventually sold the property without removing the hazardous materials, and a
subsequent owner sued Mobil under various theories for damaging the property. Id. at 94. While the
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs claims based on remedial state statutes, Id. at 98, it did summarily
dismiss the plaintiff s claims for trespass:
Count III of the complaint asserts that Mobil's releases of oil and hazardous materials at the site
constitute a trespass. A trespass, however, requires an unprivileged, intentional intrusion on
land in the possession of another. New England Box Co. V. C & R Const. Co., 313 Mass. 696,
707, 49 N.E.2d 121 (1943); Restatement (Second) Torts §158. In this case, Mobil owned and
was in possession of the property when it allegedly released the oil causing the contamination.
Thus, Mobil's releases of oil were not unprivileged, and Mobil clearly was not intruding on land
in the possession of another. Mobil's releases of oil on its own land, therefore, cannot constitute
a trespass.
Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp,, 141 F.Supp. at 99. A similar analysis, relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, was utilized in Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 355 Ms. 58; 652 A.2d 180
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(1994) to reject the trespass claims of a subsequent occupier of commercial property against a former
lessee who had caused the property to become contaminated by toxic chemicals:
Rosenblatt [plaintiff] relies upon §161 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) to
support his position that Exxon [defendant] committed a trespass when it allegedly caused the
property to be contaminated during its occupancy and the contamination continued into
Rosenblatt's occupancy of the land. Section 161 provides that: "A trespass may be committed
by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has
tortiously placed there."
Section 161 does not support Rosenblatt's position. It explicitly provides that a trespass
involves the tortious placing of something on the land and implicitly provides that the affected
land is the land of another. Section 158 further supports this interpretation. It states that "one
is subject to liability to another for trespass... if he intentionally enters land in the possession
of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or remains on the land, or fails to
remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove." Exxon did not cause the
contamination to occur during Rosenblatt's occupancy; the introduction of the contamination
could only have occurred prior to its relinquishing possession of the land. Additionally, Exxon
owed Rosenblatt no duty to remove the contamination.
Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d at 78-79. Thus, if the actor who causes the contamination is lawfully
in possession of the real property at the time the harm is introduced, there is no cause of action for
trespass. See, also, e.g., Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., 893 F.Supp. 730 (N.D.Ohio 1995)
(applying Ohio law).14

14

The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 167, comment b, indicates that unless a license to utilize
property has been granted on the condition that the licensee pay for any damage that might be done
to the property in exercise of the license, a consent to enter land for a particular purpose carries with
it a consent to harm done to the land incidental to the actor's reasonable exercise of the license). By
granting Reagan the right to erect the sign, including the foundation, as well as the right to remove
or change the sign structure at any time, and by not including any obligation to restore the property
to its pre-lease condition, Garco's predecessor consented to the continuing presence of the sign or
any of its parts. By their own terms, neither §160 nor §170 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
on which Garco has relied, comes into play if the property owner has consented to the contested
activity. Nor does the Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.2 support Garco's position. While that
section requires restoration to a pre-lease condition under certain circumstances, Garco never
demonstrated what the pre-lease condition of the property was — assuming that the area had been
used for parking before the foundation was installed, it is still being used for parking. (R. 133,^25;
(continued...)
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In the instant case, the record is clear that Reagan leased Garco's land in 1975 for the expressed
purpose of erecting and maintaining an outdoor advertising sign (R.193; lease, paragraph 1). Reagan
was lawfully in possession of the real property at the time the sign was placed on the property. Reagan
had the right in the lease to construct the sign, including its foundation as a necessary structure for
erection of the sign. Id. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the lease, Reagan had the right to remove the sign
at any time at its option (R.193). That same paragraph also gave Reagan the right to change the sign
at any time at its option. Id. But nowhere in the lease did Reagan undertake the duty to remove the sign
at the end of the lease, in whole or in part, nor is there reserved any right to Garco (or its predecessor)
to insist that the land be restored to its pre-lease condition at the end of the lease. Pursuant to the terms
of the lease, the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Garco had no right to insist that Reagan
remove the foundation. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Garco's trespass claim.
2.

Garco Cannot Impose a Duty by Implication that Reagan Did Not
Undertake.

In an effort to meet the duty requirement of the trespass doctrine, Garco argues that the lease
contained implied duties, including one to refrain from committing waste (Garco's Brief, pps. 23-24),
as well as one for good faith and fair dealing (Garco's Brief, pps. 27-28). But in the absence of an
express covenant requiring a tenant to remove the improvements at the end of the lease, the law will
simply not imply one. Sherman, 258 F.2d at 881; Duvanel, 227 P.2d at 89. This would include any
implied duty to remove the structures, regardless of how such duty is characterized:

(...continued)
Appendix 1 hereto). Garco also never presented any evidence that the probable future uses of the
Garco property would be impaired by the presence of the foundation. Under such circumstances,
§12.2 does not even apply. Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.2, Comment o.
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The nub of [the landlord]'s contention is that, under paragraph 8 [of the lease], the
[tenant] was authorized to remove all of a particular fixture, addition, or structure, including the
concrete foundations thereof, but that it could not remove a part of any such fixture, addition,
or structure, leaving portions which were unusable and expensive to remove. [The landlord]
poses the question: "if the [tenant] had removed the roof from each of the buildings, wouldn't
the Court be justified in saying that it must pay for the removal of the remaining part?"
Acknowledging that there was no express covenant to complete the removal of any structures,
[the landlord] argues that such a covenant is to be implied.
The lease in question gave the [tenant] the right to remove improvements at the
expiration of the lease, but not the duty to do so. There is no express covenant requiring the
[tenant] to restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the beginning of the
term. Under these circumstances, there is no implied covenant of the kind suggested by
appellant. The [tenant] is not liable for damage occasioned by reason of partial removal of
improvements, unless there was negligence in accomplishing such removal.
Sherman Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d at 881 (C.J. Hamley concurring).
The Sherman tenant had the right, during the existence of the lease, to add improvements, make
alterations and so forth, which would remain the property of the tenant and could be removed at any
time prior to expiration of the lease. Id. Reagan had the same right under the terms of the lease to erect
the sign and then, as the owner thereof, to change or remove the sign at any time.
By arguing that Reagan breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to
restore the property to its pre-lease condition, Garco seeks to impose additional contractual duties on
Reagan — duties that Reagan did not undertake pursuant to the lease. The law prohibits such use of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 358 U.A.R. 17, 19 (Utah
1998)(implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be interpreted to make a better contract
than the parties themselves made, nor can it be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties
to which the parties did not agree).
Additionally, having been authorized by the lease to change or remove the sign, Reagan did not
commit waste by cutting it down. See, e.g., Turman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 317 P.2d 302 (Mont. 1957)
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(no waste committed where lease authorizes tenant's act). Thus, regardless of how Garco wishes to
characterize the duty it wishes Reagan had undertaken. Reagan had no such duty under the terms of the
lease. The trial court properly ruled on this issue, and nothing that Garco raised either below or at the
appellate level changes Reagan's duties.15
3.

Whether Garco Purchased the Property Subject to the Terms of the Lease
is Irrelevant to the Dismissal of Garco's Trespass Claim.

Garco admits that it knew before it purchased the property that Reagan had a sign on the
property and was paying rent (R.366). Nevertheless, Garco argues that its purchase of the property was
not subject to Reagan's lease, and that the trial court therefore erred in relying on the terms of the lease
as a basis for dismissing Garco's trespass and unlawful detainer claims (Garco's Brief, p. 19).
However, the trial court did not need to reach this issue in order to dismiss the trespass claim. As set

In raising public policy concerns over environmental quality (Garco's Brief, pps. 24-25) Garco
appears to be arguing that Reagan breached another duty that should subject Reagan to Garco's
trespass claim. Garco did not raise this issue below until it filed its Reply Memo in Support of its
Motion to Reconsider, and introduced no evidence to support its argument. (R.475). There was no
evidence that by leaving the foundation in place, Reagan met the statutory definition of "disposal,"
which requires the "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of solid or
hazardous waste . . . so that the waste . . . may enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or
discharged into any waters. . ." U.C.A. §19-6-102(6). It also appears that the statutory/
administrative scheme applicable to solid waste would specifically exclude the foundation.
U. Admin.Code R315-301 -4 circumscribes the disposal of solid waste, and specifically excludes from
its requirements "inert waste used as fill material. . . if the disposition or disposal does not cause
a public nuisance or hazard or contribute to land, air or water pollution." (emphasis added). See,
also, U.C.A. § 19-6-102( 17)(b)(i) defining "solid waste" as excluding "inert construction debris used
as fill material." "Inert waste" is defined in R315-301-2(36) as "noncombustible, nonhazardous
solid wastes that retain its [sic] physical and chemical structure under expected conditions of
disposal, including resistance to biological or chemical attack." The record below evidences that
Reagan left the foundation in place at least in part because of Garco's concerns that its removal
would undermine the foundation of an immediately adjacent building. (R.191). There was no
evidence that the foundation would constitute a public nuisance or hazard or that it would contribute
to land, air or water pollution. Instead, as an inert substance left in place to prevent damage to an
adjacent structure, the foundation would likely be excluded under U.Admin.Code R315-301-4 from
the statutory scheme governing the disposal of solid waste. In any event, since Garco failed to timely
raise this issue, Reagan had no opportunity to introduce any evidence to rebut Garco's argument.
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forth above, in the absence of a duty to remove the foundation, Reagan did not commit trespass by
leaving in place the foundation which it had initially lawfully placed on the property pursuant to its
valid lease with Garco's predecessors. Thus, whether the lease was binding on Garco is irrelevant to
Garco's trespass claim.
4.

Garco Had Sufficient Notice of the Lease at the Time of Its Purchase of the
Property to Take Subject to its Terms.

Even if it were necessary to determine that the lease was binding on Garco in order to dismiss
the trespass claim, Garco cannot avoid its obligations under that lease simply because the document was
not recorded at the time of Garco's purchase. It was undisputed below that Reagan's sign was erected
on the property and was in place at the time Garco obtained its own interests (R.366) Garco also admits
that it knew that the sign was on the property at the time it purchased the property. Id. The law in the
State of Utah for more than 100 years is that possession of land, regardless of the state of record title,
is notice to the world of the possessor's rights:
An occupant's possession is actual notice of his title, and all persons with notice of such
possession must at their peril take notice ofhis full title in the premises, no difference what the
record shows.
Tolandv. Corey, 24 P. 190 (Utah 1890)(emphasis added); see also, Neponset Land & Live-Stock Co.
v. Dixon, 37 P. 573 (Utah 1894) (occupancy is sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry notice). This
doctrine has been affirmed by the Utah appellate courts repeatedly, and at least as recently as the Utah
Court of Appeals' decision in Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Ut.App. 1987).
Garco acknowledges that it had a duty of inquiry, but asserts that the inquiry that it made was
sufficient under the circumstances (Garco's Brief, p. 18). Paul Kingston attested that on behalf of
Garco, he relied on the seller's representations regarding the terms of the lease, as well as his own
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personal beliefs regarding Reagan's customary business practices. (R.366-67,^7,9).16 Even if Mr.
Kingston's testimony had been undisputed,17 Garco's choice to rely solely on its seller's statements
rather than to contact Reagan to verify the validity of those statements did not divest Reagan of its real
property interest. All the recording statute on which Garco has relied does is to provide notice ~ the
statute does not affect the validity of documents between parties who have notice by means other than
recordation. U.C.A. §57-3-102(3) (1998) ("This section does not affect the validity of a document with
respect to the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document."
(emphasis added)). With a duty to inquire, Garco had an obligation to make a FULL inquiry — i.e., to
pick up the telephone and contact Reagan about the terms of its lease. Neponset, supra; Toland, supra.

Garco asserts that its post-purchase discussions with Reagan also constitute evidence of
adequate inquiry. (Garco's Brief, p. 18). Those discussions are irrelevant. In order for them to have
been a part of Garco's inquiry, they needed to have been conducted prior to Garco's purchase of the
property. See, 11 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser §454 (purchaser on duty of inquiry needs to
make due and diligent inquiry or investigation before discharging duty to inquire) (cited at Garco's
Brief at p. 18).
17

The facts relating to notice and inquiry as Garco has stated them have never been undisputed.
Garco had advanced these "facts" for the first time just six days prior to the hearing on Reagan's
summary judgment motion. Despite the untimeliness of the evidence, prior to the hearing, Reagan
filed the affidavit of Garco's seller, J.Richard Lamont, who directly contradicted Paul Kingston's
testimony, stating that he delivered a copy of the lease to Mr. Kingston and that Mr. Kingston was
fully aware of the lease prior to Garco's purchase of the property (R.400-05). See, also, Affidavit of
Douglas T. Hall (R.429-30), submitted in opposition to Garco's motion for summary judgment on
Reagan's counterclaim. Given sufficient opportunity, Reagan would have disputed Garco's "facts"
even further in opposing Garco's cross-motion for summary judgment on its own claim. But the
"facts" regarding notice and inquiry were never properly before the trial court. Garco belatedly and
untimely raised the "facts" some six days before the trial court granted Reagan's motion for summary
judgment. With the exception of how they might apply to Reagan's counterclaim (which was later
dismissed by stipulation - R.515-17), any issues raised by these "facts" were mooted by the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Reagan. See, Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d
1057 (Utah App. 1994) (case is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants). Unless the trial court were to have reinstated Garco's claims by setting aside the judgment
it had already granted, consideration of Garco's cross-motion for summary judgment on its own
claims against Reagan would have been meaningless.
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Simply accepting the statements of the seller and then closing ones' eyes is not enough. The tenant's
possession of the property requires the purchaser to ask both the seller and the tenant about the
relationship - otherwise there is substantial potential for fraud against tenants with valid leases to real
property. A buyer with actual notice of the lease could simply choose not to review the document or
to contact the tenant, but to rely simply on whatever the seller stated. Regardless of whether the seller's
statements were accurate, the buyer's choice would divest the tenant of its valuable property rights -even when the buyer had actual knowledge of the lease. The recording statute does not have such an
effect. Instead, the statute specifically indicates that its recording requirements do not affect the validity
of documents with respect to anyone who has notice of the unrecorded document. U.C.A. §57-3102(3)(1998).
Nor does Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan Ass 'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App.
1987) support Garco's argument that the inquiry that Garco made was sufficient. In Diversified, the
purchaser made inquiry of the very bank which later sought to have its mistakenly released lien
enforced against the property. Id. at 1135. The bank initially advised the purchaser that the lien had,
in fact, been properly released. Later the bank learned that it had made a mistake and recorded an
affidavit stating that the release had been in error and that the trust deed was still in effect. Id. at 1135.
In an action by the purchaser to quiet title against the bank, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling in favor of the bank. The Court of Appeals ruled that, having inquired of the bank
initially, the purchaser did not have an obligation to follow up on what the bank had already stated for example, by demanding to see receipts or reconveyance instructions. Id. at 1137, fn. 5. The
Diversified purchaser was entitled to rely on the statements of the very entity whose lien the purchaser
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was seeking to avoid. But Garco never asked Reagan about the lease, although it is the encumbrance
of Reagan's lease which Garco seeks to avoid.
Garco's claim that its seller misrepresented the lease, even if true, might form the basis for a
claim against Garco's seller, but it does not bind Reagan or change the terms of its tenancy. Nor did
the seller's alleged representations relieve Garco of a duty to inquire with Reagan, as the person in
possession, to determine the nature of the relationship. The seller and Garco cannot bind Reagan to any
statements that the seller purportedly made to Garco. Those statements did not invalidate the lease.
Having had notice of the lease, Garco purchased the property subject to the lease.
5.

Garco Presented No Evidence on Which Any Court Could Rule that the
Lease was Unconscionable.

Garco never asserted until its Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reconsider that
it could avoid the lease on the basis of unconscionability or lack of consideration. Avoidance of the
lease was not pleaded as a cause of action in Garco's Complaint, nor did Garco raise this issue in its
opposition to Reagan's Motion for Summary Judgment or in support of its own (belated) cross-motion
for summary judgment.18
As a result of Garco's failure to timely raise this issue, no facts were ever developed as to
whether, as Garco claims, the lease was unconscionable. Whether a contract is unconscionable is a
mixed question of law and fact. Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah 1997). In

18

In its Reply Memo filed in support of the reconsideration motion, Garco asserted that it had,
in fact, raised the issue of unconscionability as early as its own (belated) cross-motion for summary
judgment. (R.469) But a review of Garco's memo filed in support of the cross-motion belies
Garco's claim. At R.393-94, Garco argued that the non-compete clause was unenforceable as an
"adhesion" contract. But Garco never once, until the Reply Memo, asserted that the entire lease
itself was unconscionable.
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the absence of sufficient evidence to find unconscionability, a claim of unconscionability can be
dismissed as a matter of law. Id. at 825.
Although Garco argues that various provisions of the lease are unreasonable, Garco introduced
no evidence to support its argument. For example, Garco complains that the amount of the monthly
rent payment was "paltry" (Garco's Brief, p. 20), but introduced no evidence to the trial court to
compare the rent that the lease required Reagan to pay to the amount of rent charged under similar
leases for outdoor advertising signs on similar real property. Garco further improperly asserts that the
trial court found as a matter of law that the non-compete restriction was unreasonable (Garco's Brief,
p. 20). Garco offered no evidence to the trial court on this issue, and its assertion of what the trial court
ruled is incorrect. In fact, the trial court stated that it was "not of the view that [it] could rule as a matter
of law that five years is a reasonable period [of time] for a restrictive covenant." (R.525, p.49). Because
there were insufficient facts for the trial court to rule on the enforceability of the clause, the trial court's
order simply indicated that there were factual issues preventing summary judgment on whether that
clause was enforceable (R. 437, |3). Never having introduced any evidence to support its assertion of
substantive unconscionability, Garco cannot protest that the trial court erred in rejecting this argument.
As for the "indices of procedural unconscionability" that Garco asserts, the Woodhaven Court
noted that "procedural unconscionability addresses whether the party had a reasonable opportunity to
read and understand the terms of the contract." Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 924 P.2d at 925.
Garco offered not a single fact to the trial court that Garco's predecessor was "underprivileged,
unsophisticated, uneducated or illiterate," Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028,
1042 (Utah 1985), that Garco's predecessor lacked "opportunity for meaningful negotiation," Id., that
Garco's predecessor was offered the contract "on a take-it-or-leave-it basis," Id., or that Garco's
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predecessor had any "lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation." Id. There was not a shred of
evidence that Garco's predecessor did not wholly and completely agree to each and every term of the
lease. Garco did not plead procedural unconscionability, nor did Garco offer any evidence to support
such a claim.
Finally, with regard to Garco's claim that the lease lacked consideration, even if Garco had
raised the issue before its final reply memorandum on reconsideration of summary judgment, Garco's
claim is invalid. Ignoring the regulatory climate in which Reagan operates, including the spacing
requirements of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, Garco argues that for a "pittance," Reagan could
have used the entirety of Garco's property to erect advertising signs (Garco's Brief, p. 20). Ignoring
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as well as the reality that an outdoor advertising sign along the
1-15 corridor is so valuable that Reagan would never intentionally choose to display no advertising copy
on the sign, Garco argues that Reagan could unilaterally choose to reduce the lessor's income to
effectively nothing (Garco's Brief, p. 20). Garco's arguments are nothing but unbridled speculation.
To the extent that any of these arguments were even before the trial court, they were correctly rejected.
6.

As Reagan Did Not Claim Possession of the Property After It Removed Its
Sign, Garco's Claim For Unlawful Detainer Was Properly Dismissed.

For the same reasons the trial court was correct in rejecting Garco's trespass claims, the trial
court properly dismissed Garco's unlawful detainer claim. As set forth at length above, Reagan had no
obligation to remove any of its property at the termination of the lease, including the foundation. It
was undisputed on summary judgment that Reagan removed the sign face and poles from Garco's
property in June 1995 (R.191) and moved its outdoor advertising operation to the Mollerup property
(Garco's Brief, p. 11 ^|22). Thereafter, Reagan did not conduct any outdoor advertising on Garco's
property, and did not claim any right to possession. The foundation that remained was flat (within 1/4
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inch of being level to the ground), and does not interfere with Garco's access to the building nor
utilization for parking (R. 133,1(25; R. 144-45, 146, 168) (see, also, Appendix 1). The unlawful detainer
statutes are intended to provide a summary remedy to resolve separate claims of rights to possession
of property. Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100, 105 (Utah 1944). Reagan claimed no right to
possession after June 1995. Based on these facts and the law concerning the foundation, the trial court
properly found that there were no material issues of fact as to when Reagan returned possession of the
property to Garco.
It was further undisputed that Garco did not serve a Notice of Unlawful Detainer until more than
a year later, on July 29, 1996 (R.257). U.C.A. §78-36-3 requires service of such a notice as a prerequisite to maintenance of an action for unlawful detainer. U.C.A. §78-36-3 also requires that the
defendant remain in possession of the property after service of the notice and expiration of the requisite
time period. Having relinquished possession of the property to Garco more than a year prior to being
served with the Notice of Unlawful Detainer, Reagan was not, as a matter of law, guilty of an unlawful
detainer. The trial court's ruling in dismissing Garco's claim for unlawful detainer was correct.
D.

THE LAW DOES NOT ALLOW THE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ONCE ALL SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED.

In the absence of recovery on any of its claims, Garco's claim for punitive damages was
properly dismissed. U.C.A. §78-18-1.

CONCLUSION
Although the trial court's initial order is not on appeal, the trial court committed no error in
granting summary judgment in favor of Reagan, dismissing Garco's claims. Nor did the trial court
commit error in striking portions of Garco's reply memorandum submitted in support of its motion to
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reconsider that initial grant of summary judgment. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying Garco's reconsideration motion. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.
DATED this ^ 5 *day of January, 1999.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
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APPENDIX 1

[MS. VAN FRANK]: I think just to
give the Court some context for this, I went
out yesterday, in between doing laundry and
grocery shopping, and took some pictures of
what it is we're talking about, and I'm just
going to offer them for illustrative purposes
and you can see what the issues in this
lawsuit are all about.
What you will see there is a door,
and in front of the door there is a ~ there is a
concrete circle. You can see it's very, very
close to the foundation of the building. The
concrete circle is the cap that Reagan put on
top of the foundation when they removed the
sign.
I believe Garco has since asphalted
around that, and I believe, based on Mr.
Kingston's testimony, that that would be
new asphalt this summer. But you can see
how close the foundation is to the building
and you can see that this is what is being
complained of as being trespass.
(R.541,pp.5-6).
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U.P.C. Inc dba Garco Industrial Park

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

v.
R.O.A. General Inc, dba Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Dewey Reagan,
William Reagan, Doug Hall
Case Number: 2:98cvl49S
This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a
decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that the first and second claims of the plaintiff are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
remaining state law claim which is dismissed without prejudice.
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

U.P.C., INC. d/b/a GARCO
INDUSTRIAL PARK,

)

Case No. 2:98-CV-0149-S

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., d/b/a
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
DEWEY REAGAN; WILLIAM REAGAN;
DOUG HALL; DOES 1-10,

MEMORANDUM DECIS-IONb __
)

-
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";

Defendant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants R.O.A. General, Inc. and William Reagan ("Reagan")
move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R± Civ. P~.
12(b)(6)1 for failure to state a claim for antitrust violation
because their conduct as alleged is protected by the "state action"
immunity doctrine.

1

Defendant Dewey Reagan joins in the motion.

Plaintiff has filed an objection and motion to strike
defendants' exhibit to reply memorandum, apparently urging that the
exhibits are inconsistent with a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. Because
plaintiff's pleading does not strictly comport with DUCivR 7-1, the
court will not address it. The court, however, has not considered
the materials attached to defendants' reply memorandum and the same
are excluded for purposes of defendants' motion to dismiss.

ADI^IMAI

Plaintiff U.P.C., Inc., d/b/a Garco Industrial Park ("Garco")
owns and operates storage units on land situated next to 1-15 in
Salt Lake County.

From 1975 to 1995 Reagan had an outdoor

advertising sign on Garco's property and paid rent to Garco and its
predecessor-in-interest.

In 1995, Reagan removed its sign from

Garco's property and installed it on adjacent property.

Because

state regulation requires five hundred foot spacing between outdoor
advertising signs, Garco was precluded from contracting to have
another sign erected on its property.

Garco alleges violation of

the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Utah Antitrust Act.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

When a motion to dismiss is filed-, the burden is on the movant
to prove that the non-movant can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle ±*im to reliefs

Shoultz v. Monfort

of Colorado, Inc.f 754 F.2d 318 {10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 475
U.S. 1044 (1986); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

The court

is to presume for purposes of considering the motion that all
allegations by the non-movant are true and all reasonable inferences are made in favor of the non-movant.

La£oy ,v, HMO Colorado,

988 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1993); Miree v, DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25
(1977).

Legal conclusions, deductions, and opinions couched as
2

facts are, however, not given such a presumption.
King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976); Swanson

Mitchell v.

v, Bixler, 750 F.2d

810 (10th Cir. 1984) . The likelihood that the plaintiff may or may
not prevail at trial is immaterial at the time of decision on a
motion to dismiss.

Boudeloche v. Grow Them. Coatinga Corp., 728

F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1984) .

III. DISCUSSION

Reagan asserts that its alleged anticompetitive conduct is.
immune from federal antitrust laws by virtue of the state action
immunity doctrine.

Garco urges that- application of the relevant

state action test to the facts presented establishes that Reagan is.
not entitled to immunity.

The state action immunity doctrine has been explained as
follows:
The "state action immunity" doctrine originated in Parker
v. Brown. 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315
(1943), and "'exempts qualifying state and local government regulation from federal antitrust, even if the
regulation at issue compels an otherwise clear violation
of the federal antitrust laws.'" Cost Management Services
v. Washington Natural Gas Co. 99 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir.
1996)(quoting Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The
Law of Competition and its Practice § 20.2, at 673 (West
1994)). Although the doctrine was aimed at protecting
state legislatures and state supreme courts acting in
3

their legislative capacities, it can provide protection
to other individuals or entities acting pursuant to state
authorization. £ja£ Hoover v. Ronwinf 466 U.S. 558, 568
104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995, 80 L. Ed.2d 590 (1984). In such
situations, however, "closer analysis is required" to
determine whether antitrust immunity is appropriate.
Id. ; Porter Testing Laboratory v. Board of Regents, 993
F.2d 768, 770 (10th Cir.), oeZL. denied, 510 U.S. 932,
114 S. Ct. 344, 126 L. Ed.2d 309 (1993).
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass f n v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 100 S. Ct. 937, 63 L. Ed.2d 233
(1980), the Supreme Court established a two-part test to
determine whether alleged anticompetitive conduct on the
part of a private party is immunized under the state
action immunity doctrine.
First, "the challenged
restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.1" Id. at 105, 100 S.
Ct. at 943 (quoting City of Lafayette y, Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410, 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1135, 55
L. Ed.2d 364 (1978)).
Second, "the policy must be
1
'actively supervised
by the State itself."
Id.
Application of this "rigorous" test insures that Parker
immunity is applied only where the "private party's
anticompetitive conduct j^romotesi-state^ Jgolicy, ratgher
than merely the party's individual interests." Patrick
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 £- 108 S. Qt. _i§58, JL663,: 10_0;
L. Ed.2d 83 (1988) .
Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc., Ill F.3d 1495, 1498-1499 (10th
Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997).

A.

Clear articulation test
As noted, the first prong of the state action immunity test is

whether

the restraint

policy.

Id.

at

issue is clearly expressed

as state

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.5(3) (a) prohibits outdoor

advertising signs from being erected along certain highways within

4

five hundred feet of another outdoor advertising sign.

Jleagan

urges that the obvious foreseeable result of this regulation is
that competition within five hundred feet of any existing sign
would be suppressed and, thus, the clear articulation test is met.
Plaintiff on the other hand argues that it is not enough for a
state

regulation

to have

incidental

anticompetitive effects.

Rather plaintiff urges that there must be an actual clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace
competition.

The court disagrees.

See City of Columbia v. Omni

Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373
enough, we have held,

if

(1991) ("[iJt is

suppression of competition is the

'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes").

£££ also

Porter Testing Laboratory v, Board of Regents for the Oklahoma
Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, 993 F.2d 768, 770 (10th
Cir.), ££xt. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993) (anticompetitive conduct
was "foreseeable result of authorizing a nonprofit university to
conduct soil testing").

Although plaintiff complains that Reagan has manipulated the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act to its own advantage, the gravamen of
plaintiff's complaint is the five hundred foot restriction clearly
mandated by state law.

Among the clear purposes of the Utah

Outdoor Advertising Act is "the regulation of outdoor advertising
5

consistent with zoning principles and standards _and the public
policy of this State in providing public safety, health, welfare,
convenience and enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public
investment in highways, to preserve the natural-scenic beauty of
land bordering on highways . . .". Utah Code Ann. § 27-12j-136.2.2
Zoning

regulations

have

the

foreseeable

result

of

impacting

competition.
The very purpose of zoning regulation is _to displace
unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly
has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition,
particularly on the part of new entrants. A municipal
ordinance restricting the size, location, and spacing of
billboards (surely a common form of zoning) necessarily
protects existing billboards against some competition
from newcomers.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
373 (1991). The court concludes therefore, that the first prong of
the state action immunity test is satisfied.

2

Plaintiff contends that principles of federalism underlying
the state action immunity doctrine have limited application here
because this is a "purely private action, for purely private
anticompetitive purposes, within a framework of a federal highway
beautification program enforced with state cooperation." Plaintiff's Memo in Opp. at 11. Although the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act serves to ratify an agreement entered into between Utah and the
federal government, the Act's clearly stated purpose is the
regulation of outdoor advertising consistent with state policy.
6

B.

Active state involvement test
The second prong of the state action immunity test is that the

expressed state policy restraining competitive conduct be actively
supervised by the State. Zimomra, 111 F.3d at 1499.

"[T]he active

supervision prong of the Midcal test Requires that the state
officials

have

and

exercise

power

to

review

particular

anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that
fail to accord with state policy.'" Id. (quoting Patrick v, Burget,
486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)).

The purpose of the active supervision

inquiry "is to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient
independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates
or prices have been established as..a product -of deliberate estate
intervention, not simply hy agreement among ^private parties.41
Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance fCo„, 504:UuS
621, 634-635 (1992) . Mere potential for state supervision is not
enough.

Id. at 638.

Plaintiff argues that the State did not actively supervise
defendants' removal and placement of its outdoor advertising sign
on the adjacent property, and at most the State "rubber stamped"
Reagan's request to move its sign.

7

Under Utah's extensive regulatory scheme for outdoor advertising, the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") must issue a
permit prior to installation of any outdoor sign.
§ 27-12-136.7.

Utah. .Code Ann.

No permit may be issued for erection of a sign

within five hundred feet of a permitted sign location.
Admin. R. 933-2.

Xd. ; Utah

Permits are "issued only for signs lawfully

erected or to be lawfully erected".

Utah Admin. R. 933-2-4(3).

"Written proof of lease or consent from site owner to erect or
maintain an outdoor advertising sign must be furnished by the
applicant at the time of application".

Xd. at

Provision is made for removal of illegal signs.

933-2-4 (1L).

Xd. at 933-2-8.

Provision is made for hearings regarding the legality of a sign.
Xd.

Based on Utahfs

regulatory

scheme, illustrated by the

foregoing examples, the court concludes that there is substantial
state participation in the conduct complained of to satisfy the
second prong of the state action immunity

test.

The court

concludes, therefore, that Reagan is entitled to state action
immunity for plaintiff's Sherman Act claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, Reagan's motion to dismiss is
granted. Accordingly, plaintiff's first and second claims based on
8

the Sherman Antitrust Act are dismissed for failure to state a
claim.

The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plain-

tiff's third claim based on state law, and the same is dismissed
without prejudice.
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DAVID SAM
CHIEF JUDGE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
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VI

BEESLEY SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH
WILFORD A. BEESLEY # 0257
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100

J3IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
A Nevada corporation,
Plaintiff,and Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
Civil No. C84-2857
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION.

:

Defendant and Appellant,

:
Judge David S. Young

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a
Nevada corporation, HOOD
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a California
corporation,
Defendants and Respondants.

Notice is hereby given pursuant to Rules 3 and 4,
i

Utah

rtfV?2h

Rules of Applelate Procedure, that Salt Lake City Corporation
hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the
Summary Judgment of August 31, 1985 and the Order of February 3,
1987 entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County,

State

of

Utah,

the

Honorable

Judith

M.

Billings

presiding.
DATED this {_+

day of February, 1987.

BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH

<^\ \ yg*cri\.,
Stanford P. Fitts
Attorney for Ap>pleant
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^O03^ :

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS £ WEST
Attorney for Defendant
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
Cali fornia corporation,
Defendants.

C i v i l No. C84-2857
Judge J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s

The t h i r d party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for
Summary Judgment came on r e g u l a r l y for hearing before the
Honorable J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s , D i s t r i c t Judge, on the 2nd day
of August, 1985, such defendant being represented by t h e i r
a t t o r n e y of record David A. Reeve, and t h i r d p a r t y p l a i n t i f f
Salt Lake City Corporation being represented by t h e i r

j^^^TS

attorney Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., and the plaintiff and third
party defendant James Constructors, Inc.

being represented

by their attorney of record C. Reed Brown.

The court having

reviewed the pleadings on file herein, together with third
party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for Summary
Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Marc Laulhere and the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and
having reviewed the reply affidavit of Arthur L. Keesler,
Jr., attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, and having
heard arguments from the respective counsel, and based upon
the motion of third party defendant's attorney, David A.
Reeve, the court does hereby enter the following:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
That all causes of action brought by the third party
plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation against third party
defendant Hood Corporation are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

Further, both parties hereto are to bear their

own attorney's fees and costs of court incurred herein.
DATED this Hf

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

:E M. BILLINGS

°EPUTY<
Approved as to fnrm*^*^-

<$/£&

ARTHUR L. KEESLEA, J R . / /
A t t o r n e y for S a l t Lake/Vity
Corporatior

D i s t r i c t Court Judge

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

ida&L.

nOOV<CA3

FILED IN CLEPKS OFFJCC
Salt LaS» C?«T*v'Utsh

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Defendant
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093

FEB

31987
Cjouty Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
SECOND AMENDED ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a
Nevada corporation; HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,

C-84-2857

Judge Judith Billings

Defendants.
Salt Lake City Corporation's (SLCC) Motion for
Reconsideration and Leave to Amend Their Complaint as to the
defendant Hood Corporation, came on regularly for hearing on the
22nd day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Judith Billings,
District Court Judge.

SLCC being represented by their attorney^,\r-E C/?\

of record, Wilfred A. Beasley and Stanford P. Fitts, the Hood ^ /'r ^ : \ V £

Corporation being represented by their attorney of record David
A. Reeve, James Constructors, Inc. being represented by their
attorneys of record, Jay Jensen and C. Reed Brown, and Industrial
Indemnity Company being represented by their attorney of record
C. Reed Brown.

The court having heard the arguments of counsel

with regard to the procedural aspects of SLCC's motion for
reconsideration, and having heard arguments with regard to their
motion for leave to amend their complaint, and having reviewed
all pleadings and memorandum submitted in support and in
opposition to said motions, and the court having made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That Salt Lake City Corporations motion to reconsider,

pursuant to Rule 54(b), the prior entry of summary judgment
against the Hood Corporation is denied.
2.

That Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to amend their

Complaint to add a cause of action under the alter ego theory,
against the Hood Corporation, is denied.
3.

That the prior Summary Judgment entered on the 21st day

of August, 1985, in favor of the Hood Corporation, is hereby
certified and directed by the court to be a final judgment, for
appeal purposes, inasmuch as the court makes an express finding
that there is no reason for delay.
DATED this g-

day of January, 1987.

>,<-?o*
*w>

BY T H E C O U R T ;

ATTEST
K DIXON HWDLEY

deputy Clar*

JUDITH BILLINGS
•District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, this / j

day of

January, 1987 to the following:
Wilford A. Beesley
Stanford P. Pitts
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation
310 Deseret Book Building
iSEnm^IHATTHIS|SATRUEC0PvoP
40 East South Temple
«s\^^
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
COUNTY^ATEOFirSu SALT u «
DATE

C. Reed Brown
HINTZE

& BROWN

Attorney for James Constructors, Inc.
and Industrial Indemnity Company
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Jay Jensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
/ /

DEPUTY COuAf C1£RK
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APPENDIX 4

JGH LOCATION LEASE
AGREEMENT made this
hereinafter called th* L*ssor» and R ^ L G A N OUTDOOR ADVBRTl3iN<£<NG, a Utah corporation,
harelnnfter called the Leasee,
^
I. That, for dm considersdon hereinafter mencton*d, tha Lessor doc« hereby gnat to the Lessee, and tU assigns and
mccaMoni cbe exclusive right to uso ehe following described property for the purpoa* oi erecting painted, printed, or ulumi^
aatad advertising signs, including necessary •truxrture*, davice* and eoaoecdotu, tu-^it: on the ground, on builc^ng^ eractj J
or to bo erected, or on rooit of any such buildings upoa tho following described lend, located ia tho county ol
JSeaee of
of Uuh,
Utah, and
particularly described u follows, to-wit.
JStaeo
and mo**
B O « part
LOCATION:

'<*£&*

—

^€^f^/^^^^u^^y

.jf&Ujd^r^^
LEGAL DESCRIPTION:

( I r y i «*7 p i r n o* liua i»Mf\nacai. MbMquCAt ta k» uautioA.

M M «*4 bound* U«*i datcrifUon lucnbiagt£« tocaUan.)

£&b~

2. Tba tana of this leas* shall enenmrnr* on tba _ _ _
,day of JS
sign itruccura (or
and dull conttnn* on tho tamo term* for an Initial period of ton years from the data
advertising purpose* oa tha herein daacribed premises; notwithstanding tha foregoing, it U further
.. .. understood
_
1 and agreed that
if tho first structure ia not placed within twerv* month* froa execution of thu agreemei
agreement, that the fint anniversary darn shall
bo the commencement date of tha lease tad rent_m
3. Las*** thai] pay to die Leaaor rental la tha amount of $...
yaar payable on a (MoathlyfQua«fc.itr)
S53aw*i) basis. Prior to construction and during mxch ansa a* no advertisinjc copies art being dLfplajasl- *m tne
premia** by I/»sce, tho rant shall be at tha raw 4 be* percent uC tho annual rental.
•. Lessor grand to the Lease* privilege and option to continue this 1MM for a like period on die tarn* tad condi
dona harein wt out; laid renewal ipail be daenwd ro have baaA axorcised ic* «u addiUonal period by dia continuing ia tha
possession of laid premises and me paymant of rant. Lessor agr**s at die termination of ti^ia !***• for fiv* xaarejiot to *
tha datniaad premises to any outdoor advertiser other than Lease*. ^+i&x/?g4u4fy*£*%*>****>&sL
- ^S.
bHc £{&o1iryu&ufruo7?
adt&&Ttytf&lTWc£ca ^
ruEiar regulations
5. In tha case the Ptderal. Stabs, Municipal or other public
igfy rumor
which ihail havn tha affect of reitricdng tha toe*duo, coo*true doc,. maintinanca or operation
ooeradon of ngna,
ngaa, to ai
_ to diminiah tha
value of laid prenutaa for adveruiing purpoaaa,, or Ln caae tha view of tho premises
premiics ahail
ihail beoocno
bex
'
* "Liitea may tar
obatruetcd
tho
ruinate thia leaaa upon giving tho Laoor thirty daji wtittan node*.
-

6. It ia understood that nraha avant of the termination of this lea**- under any of th* previaiott herein "tat oat, any
camtai which hai b*ca paid ia advance by the Laaaa* ahall be repaid by tho Leaaor.
' 7. Tb« Lfleieo it and thai! remain the owner of ait dgna and uenproveenanta placnd by Lease* oo said property and
ha* d>« right to remove or change th* aim* at Any dm*,
8. Th* Leaaor represents th*t he ia the owaer»tenajic-ag«nt of the premises above described and has the authority
to ezacuba due leaac.
9. In th* evont th* Luior ahouid default in any of tho covenants and agr«*mcna contained herein. Leaaor agrees
to pay all coatt and aqpenjoa that may aria* from enforcing Uiii agreement either by suit ot otherwise, including reasonahlo
attorney foea.
Lessor agree* that ho, hii tenants, agents, employeei, or other persons acting in bis bahaif, shall not pi
or main*
! . . . on
-_ die
o. pxenufe*
.. or oo any orijhborlaft
-_i. __. preouses which
u. L would
.^ ._ M ^ ^^ y obstruct th* view of
tain any object
s
structures.
such an obstruction occur* th* Least* has th* option of reoulring tha Letaor to remove said obstTuctsoo, of
Ideate* may
ma. itself ramoveth* oUttucuoq charging the cost of Mud rtmoyii to toe Lassor, or th* Lesie* may rtduca th* rantai
Lease*
harein paid to th* rum of Five DoiUrs per year so
such obstruction eondauea.
ll.

Lessor iVafl •JLgrtct, caus* to be.

wail of Lessor's

\*1MnMtfW>*^+rU'i?&'£*l

wul extend above tha parapet

12. Tbia Lease shall 'c&nuinite'th* sol* agreement of th* parties
relating to the lease of th* above described premiaes.
!
rty will be bound by any itat
-'— or promucs,
—
' or
— written,
-^
'
^ statements, wsmatses or
Neither party
itattmanu,
warranties,
oral
unless
such
1
promise* are set forth
' ' specifically
ificaily in
i n ithu
' *
13. This ajrxeeexncnt ihail inure to th* benefit oTjmd b* binding upon their heiri, personal representatives, lucceasors,
and assigns of di* panics hereto.
/

jf

v*

'

ife
SS'

IN Vf lTN£5af V/HEAEp?, ^ p a ^ t i e s ; h m t o have set their handi the day and year Hrst above written.

_^5S^04-«&e=:
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APPENDIX 5

Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690)
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc.

Third Judicial District

MY 0 1 1998
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK,
Plaintiff,

]
]
;)

vs.

]

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,

;)
;
)
]

Defendant.

ORDER

Civil No. 960906388
Judge William B. Bohling

The Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and
the Defendant's Motion to Strike, both having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501,
U.C.J.Admin., the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the file and for good cause otherwise
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Strike Points "B," "D," "E," "F," and "II" of Garco's

Reply Memo is granted.

2.

Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs

Complaint is denied.
DATED this

V

day of Apd, 1998.
BY THE COURT

William B. Bohling
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

UdrfJ
r

&Zin'^ie<ts

Mark Hansen
Attorney forYlaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this 3- 1 day of April, 1998, to the following:
F. Mark Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
-7
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APPENDIX 6

Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690)
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc.

DEC 2 9 1997

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

U.P.C., INC. d/b/a
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK,
Plaintiff,
VS.

]
;
>
]>
)
J

ORDER AND
JUDGMENT DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

>

Civil No. 960906388

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,

;
;)

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.

]

The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the plaintiffs
complaint having come on for hearing before the Hon. William B. Bohling on Monday, November
24, 1997, the plaintiff being represented by its counsel, F. Mark Hansen, the defendant being
represented by its counsel, Leslie Van Frank of and for COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.,
the Court having reviewed the file, including the pleadings, affidavits, and references to deposition
testimony, having heard the argument of counsel, and for good cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1.

The Court finds that there are no material factual disputes with respect to

whether there was a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. The undisputed
evidence is that there was a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. The face
of the lease document itself does not require removal of the sign foundation of which plaintiff has
complained. Nor does the face of the lease document require that the defendant restore the property
to its former condition upon vacating the property. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant did not
and has not trespassed on plaintiffs property by leaving the sign foundation in place when defendant
removed the sign face and poles from the plaintiffs property. Plaintiffs First Cause of Action is
therefore dismissed with prejudice.
2.

The Court further finds that there are no material factual disputes as to

whether defendant returned possession of the property to the plaintiff prior to plaintiffs service of
a Notice to Quit. Defendant returned possession to plaintiff when defendant completed removal of
the sign faces and sign structure from plaintiffs property no later than June 19, 1995. Plaintiffs
Notice of Unlawful Detainer was served more than a year later, on July 29,1996. As a matter of law,
defendant is not liable for unlawful detainer of the property, having returned possession of the
property to plaintiff more than a year prior to the plaintiffs Notice of Unlawful Detainer. Plaintiffs
Second Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
3.

The Court finds that there are factual issues with respect to whether the five-

year non-compete clause in the lease constitutes a reasonable period of time, and does not rule on
the issue of whether the non-compete clause is enforceable.

2

4.

With respect to plaintiffs Third Cause of Action for intentional interference

with economic relations, in order to prevail on its claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant's alleged
acts were undertaken either (1) for a predominant improper purpose, or (2) by improper means, and
that these acts caused injury to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that, because of the 500 foot spacing
requirements of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, defendant's placement of the new sign on the
neighboring property prevented plaintiff from leasing its property to any other outdoor advertiser.
However, even if the Court implies as true that the plaintiffs purpose in locating the sign as it did
on the nighboring property was to prevent plaintiff from erecting its own sign, there is no evidence
that any injury to plaintiff occasioned by defendant's move of the sign to the neighboring property
was an end in and of itself, designed to harm plaintiff merely for the sake of injury alone. Instead,
the defendant's move of the sign to its present location constituted legitimate competitive activity,
consistent with an effort by defendant to achieve the long-range economic goal of maximizing its
profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling competitive activity on the
plaintiffs property. Thus, there is no evidence of improper purpose. The Court also finds that there
are no disputed facts material to a determination that defendant did not act by improper means. At
the hearing, plaintiff abandoned its arguments that the lease negotiations and the defendant's threats
of legal redress in the event plaintiff utilized self-help in removing the sign constituted improper
means. With respect to the plaintiffs arguments that defendant utilized improper means in obtaining
its permit to move the sign to the neighboring property, the Court notes that it is undisputed that after
lengthy lease negotiations between plaintiff and defendant, on February 23, 1995, plaintiff advised

3

defendant that it had "elected to pursue other options" and demanded that defendant immediately
remove the sign. Defendant contracted with the neighboring property owner on April 20, 1995, and
applied to UDOT to move the sign shortly thereafter. There is no evidence that plaintiff took any
substantial steps during that interim period to attempt to secure its own permit for a competing sign.
Nor is there any evidence before the Court that the defendant's R-407 permit was improperly granted
or that the defendant's two signs being erected at the same time for some three weeks caused any
injury to plaintiff. Therefore, there is no evidence that defendant acted by improper means in
moving its sign to the neighboring property or that the defendant's act in moving the sign was the
cause of plaintiffs inability to procure its own permit. In the absence of evidence of improper
purpose or improper means, and in the absence of any evidence that defendant's acts caused any
injury to the plaintiff, plaintiffs Third Cause of Action must be and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
5.

Plaintiff has offered no evidence that defendant engaged in price

discrimination or sold anything at less than cost. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under
the Unfair Practices Act. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
6.

Plaintiff having failed to prevail on any of its substantive causes of action, the

Fifth Cause of Action for punitive damages is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

4

DATED this ; ) day of-Nevemfeer, 1997.
BY THE£OURT

Hon. William B. Bohling District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

F. Mark Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this c34 day of November, 1997, to the following:
F. Mark Hansen
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

F:\LESLIE\NOV97\ROAUPC.ORD
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no
F. Mark Hansen, #5078
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-2882
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

]i
]
]
]

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a
]
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ;)
Defendant and Appellee. ])

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Civil No. 960906388
Judge William B. Bohling

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial
Park, through the above-named counsel, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the
Honorable William B. Bohling entered in this matter on May 1, 1998. The appeal is taken from
the entire order.
DATED this

/

day of June, 1998.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify on June
mail to:

/

, 1998 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-class
Richard A. Rappaport
Leslie Van Frank
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

